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COLLECTIVE SECURITY
IN EUROPE AND ASIA

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Inis Claude
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Douglas Stuart




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Edited by
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FOREWORD

World War I, World War II, and the cold war have been the three great conflicts of the 20th century. Each has transformed the international system; each has been accompanied at the end by the hope for a collective security system that could prevent or at least contain future conflict. The Gulf War reinforced the hopes of those who see collective security as the successor to the cold war.

Collective security has also been incorporated into the 1992 *National Military Strategy* document. This study makes the case that collective security is a viable concept that can contribute to the success of our national military strategy provided that: (1) a clear, conceptual distinction is made between collective security and collective defense; (2) the two concepts are viewed as reinforcing rather than antithetical; and, therefore, (3) collective security and collective defense can be integrated to form transregional security linkages through existing multinational organizations—a "seamless web" of collective action.

This study is offered to encourage debate and to amplify the strategic concepts on which our national military strategy is based.



KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

INTRODUCTION

Gary L. Guertner

The 1992 *National Military Strategy* is built on four central strategic concepts in support of U.S. national objectives: (1) strategic deterrence and defense; (2) forward presence; (3) crisis response; and (4) reconstitution.¹ These foundations of our military strategy are supported by eight additional, but subordinate, strategic concepts.

- Readiness
- Collective Security
- Arms Control
- Maritime and Aerospace Superiority
- Strategic Agility
- Power Projection
- Technological Superiority
- Decisive Force

This study focuses on the concept of collective security. It argues that the transition to a New World Order, the growing saliency of domestic issues, and the declining resources available for defense combine to make collective security a dominant, cost-effective concept that may determine the credibility of deterrence, the capabilities for forward presence, the limits of power projection (crisis response), and the scope of public support for mobilization and reconstitution.

As collective security becomes explicitly incorporated in military strategy, definitions need to be precise. Collective security must be distinguished from collective defense, a concept often and incorrectly used synonymously. Collective security in its purest form is an idealistic, almost utopian notion on which no nation could reliably place its survival. In theory, collective security means establishing organizational structures and legal commitments to guarantee that

aggression by one state against any other would be resisted by the collective action of other members. Aggression is deterred by the credible promise of overwhelming collective resistance. A pure collective security system is the alternative to competitive military alliances (collective defense).

Collective security includes the activities sanctioned by the United Nations ranging from post-war peacekeeping operations to active military intervention or sanctions short of war. Collective security also includes the activities of regional organizations like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which may, in the future, legitimize and set in motion a similar range of collective action.

In reality, no nation can be relied upon to consistently put collective interests above its national interests. Collective security, therefore, fails the test of its central assumptions that nations perceive each threat in the same way, and are prepared to take identical risks while bearing the costs of military action.

There are, therefore, limits to collective security and a continuing need to supplement it with collective defense. What is unique about the post-cold war period is that there is both a need and an opportunity at every level of political-military planning to coordinate the structures and functions of collective security and collective defense in ways that can make both more effective instruments for security.

The three essays which follow provide policymakers and military planners with the strategic context in which coordination can occur. In the first, Inis Claude challenges the academic literature that treats collective security and collective defense as antithetical. The founders of the United Nations deliberately structured its members' obligations to preclude unwanted participation in collective security. During the cold war, the loose obligation to collective security legitimized collective defense and created a tenuous coexistence between the two. In the post-cold war world, this coexistence is being replaced by collective security's unambiguous dependency on the U.S. leadership and its ability to assemble limited, ad hoc coalitions that are legitimized by the United

Nations and other international bodies.² The future of collective security is inextricably linked to American leadership. Ironically, as American leadership in collective security has grown, its dominant role in traditional collective defense arrangements (NATO) has declined.

American leadership of a collective security system is not synonymous with being the world's policeman. The United States and its allies seem committed to a policy of "selective anti-aggression" meaning that military action is attractive only if other sanctions are ineffective and if the United States is able to mobilize ad hoc coalitions to replace the more formalized collective defense systems of the cold war. In a more general sense, the *collective deterrence* value of the United Nations may contribute even more to stability than *collective security* through its functional roles of negotiations, cooperation, central services (peacetime engagement), and the global transparency of these activities which help vulnerable states to resist coercion.

American leadership and its ability to fashion ad hoc coalitions in support of collective security will depend on the degree to which bilateral and multilateral defense agreements can be maintained, albeit in radically reduced form. Forward presence, whether defined as limited, joint cooperation³ with allies or the forward deployment of combat units, is the catalyst required to turn on U.S. power projection and crisis response in support of both collective security and collective defense.

Sheldon Simon's essay on Asian security assesses this requirement and the reasons why an Asian regional security regime akin to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is unlikely. Instead, both U.S. interests and Asian stability depend on a continued U.S. presence negotiated through a series of bilateral defense agreements, all of which are capable of supporting broad based collective security (United Nations) or an ad hoc regional coalition (collective defense) against a regional hegemon.

Similarly, Douglas Stuart's essay on European security builds upon the functional distinctions between collective defense and collective security as they apply to Europe. These

distinctions are fundamental to the creation of a new security architecture and the relative power of its European and transatlantic pillars.

Stuart views the competitive institutional struggles among NATO, EC-WEU, and the CSCE as actually strengthening NATO in the long run, resulting in a three-tiered organization that provides a seamless web of security functions ranging from collective security to collective defense.

A three-tiered NATO is based on the assumptions that:

(1) The November 1991 Rome Declaration commits the alliance to management of crises and conflict prevention anywhere in Europe. The allies have also created a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for confidence building and consultation between NATO and former members of the Warsaw Pact. The NACC has the potential to preempt many of the CSCE's areas of responsibility, pushing the cold war defensive perimeter outward, and thus toward collective security functions in place of traditional collective defense against a single, common threat.

(2) NATO can and should preserve its core of members committed to collective defense against a single external threat or coalition, even if that threat is currently ill-defined.

(3) NATO can stand firmly between Europe and the United Nations as a pan-European peacekeeping organization. The alliance would also be available to respond to requests by the UN Security Council for out-of-area collective security missions just as it did during the Gulf War.

American military presence and full political commitment are required for NATO to broaden its mandate to include commitments to both collective defense and collective security. U.S. leadership in the UN Security Council and its continued commitment to NATO and European security make NATO the ideal security broker that combines old collective defense missions with new collective security requirements that have grown out of the political rubble of the Soviet Empire.

NATO may also serve as a significant force multiplier during a period of defense reductions in every NATO capital.

It is perhaps unique in history that a single organization can serve both the functions of collectively securing an extended community of states and providing for credible collective defense against threats outside that community. Acting on that potential and fully integrating it with our own national military strategy first requires that military planners distinguish between collective security and their more familiar participation in collective defense. These essays are dedicated to that first step.

Finally, it is worth noting the new vigor of the United Nations has been demonstrated not only in DESERT STORM, but also through its peacekeeping forces currently deployed on eleven fronts. The size of U.N. "armies" is growing—22,000 in Cambodia and 14,000 in Yugoslavia.⁴ As forces increase, the knowledge and skill required for joint action at the operational level may increase the value of existing collective defense structures to complete the "seamless web" of collective action as a normal function of the New World Order.

ENDNOTES

1. Colin L. Powell, *The National Military Strategy 1992*, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992. The strategy paradigm used at all senior service colleges consists of three elements: (1) objectives or *ends*; (2) strategic concepts or *ways* to achieve objectives; and, (3) resources or *means*. The ends-ways-means construct is somewhat obscured in this document by dividing strategic concepts (ways) into two categories labeled "foundations" and "strategic principles."

2. "Ad hoc" used with "coalition" is redundant. Nevertheless, this study emphasizes that the importance of distinguishing between coalitions and alliances is just as important as distinguishing between collective security and collective defense. An alliance is a formal, long-term agreement with specified structure and obligations. A coalition is a short-term alliance that builds a consensus and coordinates common action against a single objective. Alliances are essential to collective defense; coalitions are essential to collective security.

3. Forward presence is a strategic concept that will be treated in a future SSI study. In contrast to forward deployments of military forces, forward presence may take the form of periodic deployments, joint exercises, or

training. Its contribution to collective security and collective defense will rest on its ability to signal U.S. interests and commitments. The credibility of the signal will depend on the viability of other strategic concepts, most notably, the power projection capabilities of the United States and its allies.

4. Paul Lewis, "As the U.N.'s Armies Grow, The Talk Is of Preventing War," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1992, p. E2.

CHAPTER 1

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Inis L. Claude, Jr.

The Revival of Collective Security.

The ending of the cold war has inspired a revival of serious discussion of prospects for a collective security system to maintain international order. There can be no doubt that the cold war is over, and that the threat of conquest or subversion formerly posed by the USSR or by the international Communist movement has evaporated. Equally, there can be no doubt that the end of history, in Fukuyama's millennial sense,¹ has not arrived.

Mankind faces the permanent necessity of dealing with a plethora of difficult problems, dangerous tendencies, and serious threats to order, stability, and decency in international relations. In short, national security and world order remain important and challenging problems. What is in doubt is the future of the collective security approach to the management of those problems. Is it possible, or probable, or desirable, that collective security will finally become the operative method for upholding world order? If not, may some modified version of that approach come to prominence as statesmen search for appropriate and effective means to keep the peace in the international arena? Those are the questions that I shall address in this essay.

It is necessary to begin by indicating the meaning that I attach to the term, collective security. It first came into use after World War I, referring to the scheme developed during the war, and championed by President Woodrow Wilson, for keeping the peace by setting up legal commitments and organizational arrangements designed to guarantee that aggression by any state against any other would be effectively resisted by the combined action of the other members of the multistate

system. The prevention or defeat of aggression—that is, of the pursuit by any state of any objective by military means—would be regarded as the most fundamental interest of every state, and all states would therefore accept the solemn obligation to participate in diplomatic, economic, or military measures to suppress such behavior. Every potential aggressor should be intimidated by the threat of overwhelming collective resistance; every potential victim of aggression should be reassured by the promise of the community's protection. Champions of the League of Nations hoped and intended that it would serve as the agency of a collective security system, and when events proved otherwise a considerable literature developed, deploring the League's delinquency and insisting that only the resolute acceptance and faithful carrying out of the responsibilities of a collective security system offered hope for order and stability in international relations.

Unfortunately, collective security is a term that easily lends itself to variant usages. It has sometimes been used so loosely that it appears as a synonym of peace or world order; in this usage, it refers not to a method for producing a result, but to the presumed result itself, conflating means and ends. More often, collective security has been taken to refer to any and all multilateral efforts to deal with the problem of international peace and security, rather than specifically to the scheme that gained prominence after World War I. Most importantly, the label has frequently been attached to NATO and other alliances, despite the fact that collective security was originally proposed as a substitute for the alliance system, a way of managing international relations that was deemed incompatible with, antithetical to, and infinitely more promising than the old system that featured competitive alliances. When one discusses collective security, it is obviously essential to indicate whether one refers to the old system that Wilsonians regarded as discredited, or to the new one that they proposed as its replacement.

I have always undertaken to use collective security in its original sense, distinguishing it from all other multilateral approaches to the issue of war and peace. Moreover, I should point out that much of the recent discussion of the potentialities

of collective security conforms with that usage. When former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev endorsed collective security in 1987 and 1988, he clearly advocated making the United Nations the centerpiece of a general system for mobilizing collective resistance to disturbers of international peace.² Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 sparked President George Bush's public interest in collective security, and he repeatedly insisted that the United Nations's stand against that act of aggression should be considered not an isolated case but the beginning of the organization's systematic and reliable functioning as "a center for international collective security," presiding over multilateral measures "to demonstrate that aggression will not be tolerated or rewarded."³ Bush invoked the idea of a New World Order resting upon a Wilsonian collective security system, dedicated to the universal enforcement of the rule against aggression. The widespread expression of this hope or expectation justifies our taking a careful and critical look at the future possibilities of that kind of system.

Is Collective Security Possible or Desirable?

I reached the conclusion some 30 years ago that the idea of creating a working collective security system had been definitively rejected, and that at most the idea might occasionally receive lip service.⁴ I have taken the view that the implementation of collective security theory is not a possibility to be taken seriously, and that the United Nations should be turned to other, more promising because more acceptable, methods of contributing to world order. How then am I to explain the recent revival of interest in the concept of collective security?

The first element of that explanation is the ending of the cold war, which means that the atmosphere of international politics is no longer poisoned by the mutual suspicions and animosities of the two superpowers and their blocs, that the United Nations Security Council is no longer likely to be paralyzed by clashes among the veto-wielding major powers, and that there is a good prospect for the kind of cooperation among the great powers that has always been regarded as the

essential engine of a collective security system. Attention is frequently focused on the veto power; the United Nations was intended by its founders, so the argument runs, to function as a collective security system, but this has been impossible because the United States and the USSR, preoccupied with cold war concerns, used the veto to block each other and thereby disabled the Security Council. Now, relieved on this disability, the Security Council can at last operate normally and the United Nations can finally become what it was intended to be.

This line of analysis exaggerates the original commitment of the United Nations, as expressed in its Charter, to the collective security approach. There was rhetorical enthusiasm for collective security at the founding conference of 1945, but the completed Charter represented a very attenuated endorsement. The inclusion of the veto provision in arrangements for the Security Council indicated the conviction that collective security action must not be attempted—that it would be futile and dangerous to attempt it—against a major power or a state enjoying the support of a major power; this left severely limited scope for a United Nations' enforcement system. The use of the veto during the cold war has conformed with, rather than violated, the intentions and expectations of the founders, by preventing efforts at collective enforcement action that might have precipitated a showdown among major powers. If the United Nations should now become a full-fledged collective security system, committed to frustrating every act of international aggression, this would represent not the realization but the expansion of the founders' ambitions and the abandonment of their caution.

The sweeping political changes of recent years have certainly increased the capacity of the Security Council to reach decisions with promptness and near unanimity. There may still be disagreements among the most powerful members of that body but, rather than being dedicated to frustrating each other, they are now disposed to cooperate and to support the United Nations. This is to say that the predictably blocked Security Council no longer exists as an impediment to collective security action. It would be wrong, however, to infer

that such action will now reliably occur. The failure of the United Nations to serve as a collective security agency is attributable to the *rejection* of collective security obligations by its members, not to the frustration of their wish to act in fulfillment of those obligations. The United Nations has not consisted, and does not now consist, of states eager to take part in a collective security system and resolved to do so at the first opportunity. The favorable developments in the Security Council do not, in removing the cause of the infeasibility of collective security, also remove the causes of its unacceptability to statesmen and peoples, some of which I shall consider below. An automobile does not climb the hill just because its brake has been released, but requires a battery, fuel, and a driver intent on driving up the hill. So it is with collective security, which requires a motive force supplied by states convinced of the wisdom of, and willing to pay the price of participation in, the universal enforcement of the antiaggression rule.

The notion that the removal of cold war obstacles will initiate the implementation of the long-deferred Charter plan for the United Nations is fanciful enough to be dubbed the "Rip Van Winkle Theory" of the United Nations. I would argue that the United Nations has not been asleep for these 40-odd years, with its members waiting impatiently to develop the kind of organization contemplated in the Charter and ready to do so at the moment of its awakening. The organization has not been stalled and stymied; even the Security Council has suffered only partial paralysis, and the other organs, while significantly affected by the cold war, have nonetheless been very active. Far from being dormant, the United Nations has changed in fundamental ways, becoming something quite different from the 1945 model. Its members have differed with each other, and with the framers of the Charter, about the purposes to which the United Nations should be directed, and the organization's political process has featured the redefining of its objectives as various blocs have succeeded in making it serve their interests and values. In particular, states of the Third World, having become a dominant majority in the General Assembly, have achieved substantial success in converting the United Nations into an instrument of their revolution against the status quo. Some states may wish to have the United

Nations revert to the 1945 model, but members of the Third World are unlikely to join them; the ending of the cold war poses no temptation to that group to relinquish control over the United Nations, give it back to its original owners, and allow it to become what its founding fathers had in mind.

For the United Nations to become a full-fledged collective security system would be especially distasteful to its present proprietors, because that would buttress the international status quo that they are intent upon subjecting to drastic modification. In rejecting forcible change, collective security limits change to that achievable by peaceful means, which often comes painfully close to meaning that one must accept the status quo. The pain in that proximity is especially acute for revolutionaries, but it is not confined to them, for prudent people of every ideological stripe have some degree of sympathetic understanding of the need for change and the disastrous consequences of rigidity. The United Nations has become, under the influence of the Third World, an agency for bestowing legitimacy upon, and lending some support to, demands for change in the name of justice, including in some instances violence in the expression of those demands. The ending of the cold war cannot be expected to bring about such a political and moral transformation as to reverse that situation. To talk about the United Nations now becoming what its Charter envisaged is to contemplate turning the clock back, undoing the evolution of 40-odd years, rewinding its history—a dream as idle in this case as in most others. The United Nations will not move back to its Charter. It will move ahead. Whether it will move toward collective security depends not on the hopes of its founding fathers but on the attitudes and judgments of their operating sons and daughters.

Verbal support for collective security is never lacking, so long as the focus is on the promise of peace. Many are quite properly skeptical of the expectation that a collective security system could reliably maintain a peaceful world in which all states enjoy security, but nobody confesses opposition to that outcome (at least for the long term; as we noted above, some would postpone that orderly situation until current objectives necessitating violent change are attained). Neither statesmen

nor their peoples are likely to avow discomfort at being required to pledge abstention from aggression, if only because they will insist that any military measures that they undertake do not constitute aggression. But if states do not claim the right to commit aggression, they do claim, and treasure, the right to decide for themselves when, whether, and how to react to aggression committed by and against other states. Support for collective security is highly problematic, when the focus is on the obligation to join in collective resistance to aggression.

I have argued elsewhere that collective security is the ideology of a coalition that is at or near the point of winning a major war, and that zeal for accepting the responsibilities of membership in a collective security system is ephemeral, "a product of the afterglow of successful war....that... seems to disappear after a few years, when the afterglow fades into mere aftermath, and a postwar period begins."⁵ This phenomenon is easy to explain. States engaged in a successful joint venture against a common enemy are not impressed by the alleged difficulty of arriving at an agreed identification of an aggressor. They are acting on the conviction that it is less costly to defeat an aggressor than to give way to him, and they are proud of what they are doing. They readily accept the proposition that such resistance to aggression should become the rule of international life, and they harbor the notion that their sacrifice in the present case might have been rendered unnecessary if their resolve to defeat aggression had been clearly formulated and proclaimed in advance. Peacetime, however, brings increasing ambivalence about the merits of the claims of competing states, growing difficulty in creating and maintaining either domestic or international consensus on the handling of crises, and the steady advance of the view that confrontation is to be avoided at almost any cost, in favor of concession and compromise. Negotiation becomes the magic word, and the collective security approach comes to be regarded as too rigid and bellicose, a hard-line approach that provides a recipe for exacerbating rather than easing international tensions, and for getting one's state into unnecessary trouble. As the successful collective action against the late aggressor fades into distant memory, acceptance and fulfillment of the duty to join in resistance to any and all aggressors begin to look less like

principled and responsible statesmanship than like foolhardy overcommitment, imprudent attachment to the status quo, and dangerous sacrifice of sovereign discretion in responding to international developments.

The first surge of support for collective security came in the late stages of World War I, but members of the League of Nations progressively retreated from the obligation to enforce the peace during the next two decades. World War II inspired much brave talk about creating an international organization that would have teeth and the will to bite aggressors, but the resolution faded so quickly that the United Nations' involvement in the American-led resistance to North Korea's aggression in 1950 seemed a surprising reversal of expectations and intentions. The Korean War sparked a fleeting enthusiasm for creating something resembling a collective security system, manifested in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, but that zeal did not survive the military difficulties and political anxieties caused by China's entry into the fray.

It may well be that the termination of the cold war will produce a similar peak-and-valley pattern in the graph of support for the notion of collective security. Although in a certain sense that struggle was an alternative to war, an extraordinarily innovative relationship between antagonists that prevented the outbreak of the dreaded World War III, it may also be interpreted as a genuine war—as an extension of World War II, since there was no significant interval between that conflict and the cold war, or perhaps as World War III itself, fought by other and generally less lethal means than the world had come to expect in global conflicts. At any rate, the cold war was enough like a war for its termination to engender events and reactions characteristic of the final stages of major conflicts. These include the collapse of the defeated empire, the demise of the system that led it to disaster, and the recognition by the victors of their responsibility to give assistance so as to prevent total chaos and promote constructive rehabilitation.

Postwar-like reactions to the end of the cold war also include the initial exuberant expectation that this event would

usher in an era of universal political and economic freedom and multilateral cooperation. New hopes for collective security are one aspect of this immediate post-cold-war exhilaration. There are already signs of the customary shift to the less positive mood of peacetime: not only Americans but Westerners generally are increasingly looking inward, insisting on the primacy of domestic problems and questioning the necessity and justification for continuing to bear onerous international burdens. The next few years may well supply additional confirmation of the thesis that support for participation in a collective security system is a passing fancy, briefly entertained by victors in coalition wars.

Collective Security and American Leadership.

But what are we to make of the international response to Iraq's aggression in August 1990 (a case that I shall hereafter refer to as the Gulf War)? In this instance, the United Nations Security Council acted promptly and almost unanimously to condemn the conquest of Kuwait, warn against further aggression, demand the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, order economic sanctions against Iraq, and authorize such military action as might prove necessary to bring the aggressor to heel. This official United Nations' position enjoyed massive support, and was in the end enforced by a brief but decisive military action, carried out by a coalition of some 30 states under American leadership. This was a brilliantly successful case of collective enforcement. Did it mark the beginning of the development of a post-cold-war collective security system, or the beginning of the end of post-cold war enthusiasm for collective security? Was it a precedent or a unique occasion?

I believe that the Gulf War was a special case; it may not prove to have been the Last Hurrah of collective security, but neither was it a resounding vote of confidence. What happened was substantially what would have occurred under the auspices of a collective security system, although there was more improvisation than should have been necessary if there had been a well-established system. It aroused a great deal of talk about creating such a system, but I think it did not in fact foreshadow or promote that project.

This was an ideal case for the application of collective security doctrine. Iraq was a flagrant aggressor, led by a regime that attracted scant sympathy outside its borders. For most states, the perception of a vital national interest in forestalling Iraq's gaining control over a major portion of the oil that serves as their life-blood provided a powerful supplement to, or an adequate substitute for, their adherence to the antiaggression principle. The USSR withdrew its long-standing support of Iraq, indicating that it would at least acquiesce in action against the aggressor, which thereby lost any prospect of significant external aid. The United States, with multiple interests in the Middle Eastern region, had a newly buttressed military capability and a new freedom from cold war considerations that enabled it to serve as leader and protagonist. In the end, sharp and decisive action by coalition forces ousted Iraq from Kuwait at a surprisingly low cost. An aroused community overwhelmed an isolated offender. No champion of collective security could ask for a better advertisement for his cause.

Even this case, however, demonstrates the thinness and fragility of support for collective security. There were deep divisions in the United States, particularly about the decision to go beyond economic to military sanctions, and it is probable that only the speed and relative ease of the victory prevented the rise of virulent opposition. Although President Bush was extraordinarily effective in mobilizing the Security Council to enunciate the will to resist Iraq and in organizing the coalition that enforced that will, most members of the United Nations were more acquiescent than supportive. For many of them, the Gulf War was not a United Nations' undertaking in which the United States served as the chief participant, but an American venture of dubious wisdom that the United Nations had been induced to endorse. The modesty and tentativeness of support for collective action in this case strongly suggest that the world is unlikely to unite in determination to act against aggression in all future cases. The validity of this judgment seems especially clear when one reflects on the fact that the more typical international conflict entails uncertainty and disagreement about the identity of aggressor and victim, divided sympathies and interests on the part of other states, and the possibility that collective involvement would trigger a

long, costly, and indecisive struggle. Even this case, I think, vividly illustrates many of the difficulties about collective security that have contributed, and still contribute, to the general rejection of its prescription for the management of international relations.

The most basic of these difficulties lies in the fact that the ultimate reliance of a collective security system is on joint military operations to stop or repel aggressors; it requires that participating states be willing to fight for that purpose. Unfortunately for collective security, a fundamental precept of the foreign policy of modern democratic states is that war should be treated as an absolutely last resort, to be avoided so long as there is any remotely reasonable alternative. Membership in a collective security system, however, requires states, without themselves having been attacked, to choose to fight against the designated aggressor. From a nationally self-interested point of view, fulfillment of this obligation has the appearance of gratuitous involvement in potentially dangerous clashes. Moreover, the defensive character of that involvement is subject to challenge. Even though the state can claim that it is engaged in defense of a victim of aggression and of the principle essential to world order, the fact remains that it initiates battle against another state. Saddam Hussein wanted peace with the United States; George Bush decided to make war against Iraq.

The longer a military response to aggression is delayed—for whatever reasons, including the commendable urge to "give peace a chance" by exploring nonmilitary alternatives—the more vulnerable are the agents of collective security to the charge that they are themselves acting as aggressors—that is, that they are choosing rather than responding to war. The Gulf War illustrated this point; when the fight to oust Iraq from Kuwait began, after more than 5 months of futile effort to achieve that result peacefully, Coretta Scott King declared that she "strongly deplore[d] and was deeply saddened by the White House decision to launch a war against Iraq," and Pope John Paul II characterized the campaign as an outbreak of war that represented "a grave defeat for international law and the international community."⁶ Such was the reception, by these

and many other high-minded moralists, of an enterprise that had at least a substantial claim to being regarded as the liberation of a people from ruthless conquest and brutal occupation, the enforcement of the international prohibition of aggression, and the implementation of the proclaimed will and purpose of the United Nations.

Although the delay in the collective military response to Iraq's aggression was long enough to blur its defensive and reactive nature, it was not long enough to satisfy many critics in the United States and elsewhere, who believed that nonmilitary measures, notably economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures, might in time have achieved the restoration of Kuwait's independence. Some of these critics, no doubt, were absolute or virtual pacifists who would never have been convinced that the time had come for military action. Many of them, however, simply adhered to the last-resort concept of war, recognized that Iraq was highly vulnerable to economic pressures, thought it important to test and demonstrate the potency of nonmilitary sanctions, and believed that within a reasonable time Iraq could be compelled to renounce its conquest without bloodshed and massive destruction. In retrospect, they appear to have been mistaken. The economic sanctions against Iraq were supplemented, not superseded, by military measures, which indeed vastly intensified their effect. Those sanctions, still in force, have at this writing (January 1992) operated for nearly 18 months without breaking the will or undermining the regime of Saddam: we have every reason to believe that, without DESERT STORM, Iraq would still sit astride Kuwait. In that case, would the coalition still be available for military compulsion?

Nonetheless, the debate about whether and when to resort to collective force against Iraq was legitimate, and such uncertainties and disagreements are perennial features of collective security. At what point in an international crisis should efforts at settlement by pacific means such as negotiation or mediation give way to the collective security approach of identifying, condemning, and confronting the aggressor? How long should nonmilitary sanctions be given to do their work before military measures are added? How much

delay is compatible with reasonable concern for the fate of the people victimized by aggression—who are, after all, the essential clients of a collective security system? How much delay is compatible with the retention of a military option, and with general recognition of that option's defensive character? We can be certain that these issues will always produce controversy, and that, as peacetime lengthens, there will be increasing pressures for preferring compromise to confrontation and for postponing military responses to aggression.

Another significant difficulty about collective security lies in the uncertainty as to its actual and proper military objectives: when and where should it stop, what constitutes victory, and who should decide these issues? Theorists of collective security have offered little guidance beyond the simple formula that aggression should be deterred if possible and stopped or rolled back if necessary. Their emphasis on the promise of deterrence has discouraged close attention to the unpleasant details of what to do when deterrence fails, lest soft-line supporters be reminded that collective security is a hard-line approach to world order.

These issues were troublesome in the Korean War, in which military objectives were first expanded and then contracted, disagreement developed about the locus of authority to make such decisions, anxieties about the possibility of imprudent ends and means emerged, and, ultimately, the issue of whether the United Nations' coalition won or lost the contest remained a matter of contention. In the Gulf War, there was initial agreement that the United Nations' mandate called solely for the liberation of Kuwait. The United States was regarded by some, at home and abroad, as excessively belligerent, and concern was widely expressed as to whether President Bush would accept the limitations of that mandate or push on to destroy Iraq's forces and overthrow Saddam Hussein. His abrupt termination of DESERT STORM when Iraq had been driven from Kuwait disarmed those who would have condemned him for going too far—but opened the way for subsequent criticism (perhaps by some of the same people) to the effect that he had not gone far enough, criticism

inspired by the postwar behavior of Iraq's regime. This issue, as to whether a satisfactory conclusion of the United Nations-sponsored action would entail such additional achievements as a just solution of the Kurdish minority problem, the elimination of human rights abuses in Iraq, and the displacement of Saddam's dictatorship by a democratic and peace-minded government, calls to our attention the widespread discomfort with collective security's absolute and exclusive opposition to aggression.

Not only does the world reject the notion that every military effort to change the international status quo, without exception, should be condemned and collectively resisted, but it also denies that aggression is the evil that requires and justifies concerted international response. Senator George J. Mitchell spoke for the Democratic Party when he responded to President Bush's discussion of the Gulf War in the 1991 State of the Union message by criticizing Bush's failure to react to such events as the massacre of students in China and the killing of priests in Central America as he had reacted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, saying: "We cannot oppose repression in one place and overlook it in another."⁷ It is difficult to know whether such criticisms are really intended to expand the scope of collective enforcement action or to discourage its use even against aggression; most of the objectionable features of collective security would only be intensified if the targets of the system were broadened to include states guilty of malfeasance other than aggression. In any case, we are far from having reached a genuine international consensus on the objectives that should and should not trigger collective enforcement.

The question of the proper mission of collective forces leads us directly to issues of direction, control, and leadership. Collective security theory has largely ignored such matters; its theme is multilateralism, which emphasizes the mass of followers rather than the elite of leaders. Leadership smacks of unilateralism, with its unfortunate connotations. Realism demands, however, acknowledgement that the coalescence of many states into an antiaggression force is not likely to be a spontaneous occurrence. Such an event requires contrivance, which depends upon leadership.

The dedicated multilateralist's favorite candidate for leadership of collective security is the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or, possibly, the Security Council. The former official has important responsibilities in this connection, but, as I have argued elsewhere, he can be the effective leader only of activities carried out primarily by the Secretariat over which he presides.⁸ Collective security is a job to be done by states, and it requires state leadership. Again, the Security Council has a crucial role to play in collective enforcement, but leadership is a function of individual states, not of a council of 15; the Security Council is an entity to be led, not to lead.

The only state that has thus far been found willing and able to lead collective enforcement actions on behalf of the United Nations is the United States. It did so in both the Korean War and the Gulf War, and it is clear that there would have been no multilateral response to aggression in either case without American initiative and leadership. Early reactions to the ending of the cold war included the expectation that the Soviet Union and the United States might henceforth serve as partners in leading the United Nations, but that hope has vanished as the former USSR has come to appear more as a potential trouble spot than as a prospective codirector of the United Nations. By and large, the United Nations does not like American leadership in antiaggression ventures, and complains about American arrogance and inclination to run the show unilaterally, without adequate authorization, consultation, or control by the Security Council. When the United States cannot be charged with disregarding the United Nations, it is convicted by critics of exploiting the organization, twisting the United Nations' arm to secure endorsement of its own policy. This occurred in the case of the Gulf War, when unaccustomed deference to the United Nations brought the United States remarkably little credit. But timely and decisive action by multilateral bodies such as the United Nations is utterly dependent upon the determined leadership of a great power that has the resolution and audacity to move out front, to pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, and to live with the inevitable criticism. Multilateralism is not the

antithesis of unilateralism. It depends upon, and starts with, unilateralism. Multilateralism is unilateralism plus.

While other leaders may emerge in the United Nations, for the foreseeable future the United States, the sole remaining superpower, is the only one available for ventures in collective enforcement. This means that, strictly speaking, there can be no full-scale collective security system, for the antiaggression rule cannot be enforced against the United States. If the theory of mutual deterrence is to be taken seriously, the world now stands exposed to the danger of unbridled American expansionism, given the demise of the opposing superpower. I suspect, however, that the world is, and ought to be, less concerned about a possible imperialist binge by the United States than about a probable isolationist tendency—a turning inward, a focus on pressing domestic issues, a diminishing interest in and capacity for active international leadership. On the one hand, the ending of the cold war certainly increases the political feasibility of collective enforcement under American leadership, and it may well increase the number of occasions requiring such action. On the other hand, the elimination of cold war considerations sharply reduces the American incentive for leadership in such matters.

In the absence of superpower competition, Americans may well doubt that the national interest requires or permits such costly and risky operations. Economic capacity as well as political will is involved in this potential lessening of America's international prominence; our triumph in the cold war was in some respects a Pyrrhic victory, leaving us weakened, depleted, and dispirited. Despite its many assets, the United States is a society in crisis, struggling to muster the will and find the means for coping with fundamental problems. Is there, indeed, *one* surviving superpower? The world may yet have occasion to confess again that it is really most worried not about America's strength but its weakness, not about America's hyperactivity but its inability to act, not about its malfeasance but its nonfeasance.

I doubt that the members of the United Nations could be impelled, by any leader, to become active participants in a system designed to frustrate every military effort to alter the

status quo. Most of them are, at the maximum, prepared to authorize the United States to act in certain instances; for them, collective action is not a "do it yourself" but a "let the Americans do it" scheme. Moreover, I am aware of nothing in the current political climate or national mood of the United States that leads me to believe that either the American public or its political leadership is disposed to initiate or support such a system.

True, President Bush has talked grandly of a New World Order grounded on the principle that every act of aggression will be met by collective resistance. Such hyperbole is traditional in discussions of collective security; in such talk, "sometimes" becomes "always," and "perhaps" is inflated to "certainly." But statesmen do not adopt abstract principles such as the one stated above and derive from them policy for concrete situations; rather, they set policy in more pragmatic fashion, and then defend it by asserting its conformity with principle. I suggest that Bush's actual position is well stated in a comment about the Gulf War made by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and not repudiated by the President:

This happens to be one of those times when it is justified to... send American forces into combat to achieve important national objectives. But they are very rare. Just because we do it successfully this once, it doesn't mean we should therefore assume that it is something we ought to fall back on automatically as the easy answer to international problems in the future. We have to remember that we don't have a dog in every fight, that we don't want to get involved in every single conflict....⁹

The United States and most other members of the United Nations appear to be committed to a policy of *selective antiaggression*, meaning that in some instances aggression will be condemned by the United Nations and countered with collective measures, blessed by the United Nations but mobilized largely by the United States. These measures will include military action only if other sanctions seem ineffective and if the United States is able to mobilize ad hoc coalitions that seem likely to replace the more formalized collective defense systems (e.g., NATO) of the cold war. This policy, rather than the commitment to comprehensive antiaggressive

reaction entailed by collective security, seems to me to represent the wave of the future.

Conclusions.

This choice of selectivity is not altogether reassuring. Discrimination among cases is always likely to appear arbitrary, inviting charges of double standards, hypocrisy, and invidious favoritism. There will be bitter disagreements about which aggressors to oppose and which victims to defend. The moral claim to principled behavior on behalf of world order will not ring true when some acts of aggression are ignored and the integrity of some states is sacrificed. Moreover, the selective approach fails the test of deterrence. It allows would-be aggressors to hope that they may be permitted to act with impunity, and provides no sense of security to potential targets of aggression. Thomas Franck has suggested that the total abandonment of the principle that aggression must be defeated may be preferable to occasional adherence to it, on the ground that "a principle with just enough life to rally defenders but not enough to deter violators is a particular danger to world stability, leading to unpredictability and potentially lethal miscalculations."¹⁰ Selectivity clearly does not realize the collective security ideal of equalizing the security and neutralizing the aggressive ambitions of all states.

The real choice, however, is not between "sometimes" and "always," but between "sometimes" and "never." Is there value in the possibility of collective measures under United Nations auspices in some cases, even if not in all? I believe that there is, and that the selective approach has merits in addition to the obvious one of having the political acceptability that is denied to collective security.

One of those merits lies in the fact, understood and appreciated by most statesmen, that all acts of aggression are not equally threatening to world order. Some cases pose serious challenges to global stability, while others are relatively trivial or have only regional or local significance. Categorization depends upon the geographical setting of the conflict, the identities of the attacker and the state under attack, the scope

of the attack, and a host of other circumstances. Statesmen have quite properly rejected the doctrine of collective security that requires every violation of the peace to be treated as if it were the beginning of World War III. Discrimination makes sense, and is in fact a fundamental obligation of responsible statesmanship.

Selective enforcement of the antiaggression principle has the merit of respecting the mandate of national leaders to look after the interests of the societies that they govern, and pressing them to make sober and deliberate assessments of what that duty entails. Disregard of national interests by statesmen is neither probable nor proper; what is desirable is great care in identifying and ranking those interests and determining how best to serve them. Such sensible behavior is encouraged by the selective approach to peace enforcement, in favorable contrast to the demand by champions of collective security that statesmen simply and automatically assume that the national interest requires involvement in every case of international aggression.

A standard criticism of collective security is the charge that it risks turning every local encounter into a global conflict by drawing outsiders into the fray. Ideally, of course, a collective security system would prevent war altogether, or convert the defeat of every aggressor into an easy police operation by overwhelming forces, but there is point in the argument that the world should prefer the insistent localization of clashes to a tactic that increases the risk of exacerbating and spreading conflict. It is a virtue of the principle of selectivity that it invites thoughtful consideration of the question: is the outbreak of a major international war likely to be prevented, or promoted, by the intrusion of the community at large into the present case?

Finally, the principle of selectivity encourages attention to the issue of the consequences likely to flow from victory by the aggressor in the case at hand. Will this case prove only prelude to further conquests by an emboldened and empowered aggressor, or is this a discrete instance, an effort at settlement of a specific grievance? Will the triumphant aggressor fasten a ruthless tyranny upon the conquered people for the indefinite future, or use its position to promote establishment of a more

decent regime than existed before, then restoring independence to the state? In identifying cases that justify or require general international reaction, the distinction between the probable aftermaths of an Iraqi conquest of Kuwait and an American invasion of Panama is an important one. Selective antiaggression, unlike collective security, conforms with today's United Nations consensus that the judgment of aggression should be affected by the cause that it is deemed likely to promote or damage.

All of these merits that I impute to the selective approach to collective enforcement are dependent upon the exercise of sound and honest judgment. Abuses and mistakes are, of course, eminently possible—even probable, perhaps inevitable. We know from experience that world order is not as fragile and as susceptible to destruction by any and every act of aggression as the theory of collective security has insisted, but the identification of the cases that do, and those that do not, endanger the general stability will not be flawlessly performed. Statesmen will not invariably exhibit a correct understanding of the kind of international behavior required by the national interests of their peoples, and they will sometimes misjudge the consequences of their acting, or their deciding not to act, in response to aggression. To concede all this, however, is only to acknowledge that the conduct of international relations is an art rather than a science. The management of relationships in a multistate system requires prudence, a blend of courage and caution, a gift for creative improvisation, a sensitivity to circumstances, and—above all—good judgment and good luck. No formula can replace, or guarantee, wise statesmanship. This, I think is the ultimate justification for the principle of selectivity.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that what states collectively do or decline to do about aggression by one state against another is not the only factor, and may not be the decisive one, in determining how peaceful and orderly the world will be, or how secure individual states will feel. The world faces problems and prospective upheavals to which a scheme for dealing with international aggression, whether a collective security system or commitment to selective enforcement

measures, is quite simply irrelevant. The antiaggression motif concentrates on *policy wars*—wars begun by calculated decisions by states. But there are also *predicament wars*—conflicts into which states slip or drift, wars stemming from tensions, frictions, mutual fears, and misjudgments rather than from a predatory policy adopted by one side or the other, wars into which states are trapped by circumstances. The world has not seen the last of such conflicts, to which antiaggression schemes do not apply. Moreover, such schemes have little bearing on situations of civil war, and it has already become evident that the ending of the cold war and the associated dissolution of the USSR have initiated a period of ethnic clashes and secessionist movements that are likely to trigger internal violence in numerous countries around the world. World order will be endangered by the domestic discontents produced by economic deprivation, social injustice, contempt for human rights, autocratic rule, and subordination of ethnic, religious, and other minorities. Coping with the problems of internal strife is a crucial aspect of the task of building an orderly world, an aspect essentially separate from, and no less important than, dealing with acts of aggression.

There is a case for optimism about the consequences of the United Nations' liberation from the stultification imposed by the cold war. That case does not lie, I think, in the hope that the organization will institute a collective security system, and not primarily in the possibility that it will promote collective enforcement measures in selected cases. Instead, it lies in the prospect that a revitalized United Nations may, by facilitating negotiation and cooperation and by developing its potential as a central service agency (Peacetime Engagement), contribute substantially to solution of problems distinct from, and in most instances not directly related to, aggression. The major value of a resurgent world organization can be expected to derive not from increased power to coerce states, but from expanded usefulness to states.

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CHAPTER 2

REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES IN ASIA: THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE

Sheldon W. Simon

Introduction.

During the cold war era, U.S. alliance goals in Asia were straightforward: to create a series of primarily bilateral security agreements that would serve as a *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China as well as their allies in North Korea and Indochina. Hopefully, these alliances would deter any expansionist designs on the parts of Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Hanoi. When deterrence failed, the United States fought its only protracted wars since 1945, in Korea and Vietnam, with mixed results for Washington's future alliance commitments. The Nixon Doctrine (1969), formulated to cope with the disappointments and trauma of the Second Indochina War (1965-75), underlaid America's Asian strategy through the 1980s. Briefly, it promised military aid to friendly and allied states to assist in the creation of their own capacities to defend against potential Communist aggressors; but it no longer guaranteed direct U.S. military involvement in the event of hostilities. Both the decision to go to war and its prosecution became the responsibility of Asian leaders, not American.

The singleminded focus on anticommunism from the 1950s well into the 1980s created other problems for U.S. foreign policy. In order to construct the largest possible coalition against the USSR and its clients, Washington frequently subordinated and sometimes ignored other policy values such as human rights and democratic development. Repressive and habitually corrupt regimes were supported from Korea through Southeast Asia as long as they professed anticommunism. Additionally, the United States subsidized the early industrialization of its Asian allies' economies by providing preferential access for their products in the American market

and permitting protectionism against U.S. goods and services in Asian markets. These policies encouraged U.S., Japanese, and European multinational corporations to establish export industries throughout East Asia whose primary consumers were in the United States. Indeed, during the 1980s, exports to the United States generated by these corporations contributed substantially to the current U.S. balance of payments deficit. In short, America's Asian allies have also become important economic competitors, complicating the security relationships that have been established over the past 30-40 years. In addition to military capabilities and intentions, then, security arrangements for the 1990s must take economic linkages into account. The key issue for U.S. strategic planners dealing with Asia will be whether alliances and economic rivalry can coexist. In other words, can U.S. political leaders continue to underwrite the defense of states for whom that subsidization enhances commercial competitiveness?

Throughout the 20th century, U.S. interests in East Asia have been remarkably consistent through two world wars as well as the cold war. As a trading nation, the United States has sought stability, opposition to hegemony by any regional power, and political and economic access for all to the region's goods and services. Since the end of the Second Indochina War, the United States has pursued these goals through a balance-of-power policy, endorsing the China-ASEAN Cambodian resistance coalition against a Soviet-Vietnam backed rival; bolstering South Korea against North Korea; urging increased military spending and more regional defense responsibilities upon Tokyo; fostering ASEAN's development; and offsetting Soviet naval activities by maintaining forward deployed U.S. forces along the western Pacific littoral.¹

By the 1990s, however, the underlying rationale for this strategy was unravelling. The Soviet Union had disintegrated. China was focusing inward on its own economic development and political stability. The ASEAN states and Vietnam were moving toward a new rapprochement as the latter abandoned its plan for Indochina hegemony and agreed to a United Nations Perm 5 plan for resolution of the protracted Cambodian imbroglio; and the two Koreas finally seemed to agree on a

program of peaceful coexistence, possibly leading to some form of confederation by the end of the century. In effect, the cold war has ended with what appears to be a major Western triumph.

However, the dismantling of one international political structure does not mean the cessation of international politics. On the contrary, the transition through which the world now moves is potentially more unstable than its cold war predecessor. Clear lines between old allies and enemies fade as the former become commercial competitors and the latter new trade, aid, and investment partners.

The reduced East Asian military threat environment has been acknowledged by the Defense Department's April 1990 East Asian Security Initiative (EASI). While claiming to sustain all previous alliance commitments to Japan, the ROK, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia, DoD announced a 10 percent personnel cut of the 143,000 forward deployed U.S. forces in East Asia by 1993. Two subsequent phased reductions would draw down U.S. forces in the western Pacific to less than 100,000.

EASI logically follows the end of the cold war and U.S. budgetary constraints. However, it also introduces new uncertainties into East Asian security considerations. First and foremost is the possible dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance, no longer buttressed by a common Soviet threat. This prospect is particularly unnerving to other Asian states which fear that Japan will increase its own air and naval deployments to compensate for the loss of U.S. protection for its trade routes. The addition of a dominant Japanese military presence to its imposing regional economic position as major aid and investment partner could recreate the old "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" so prized by Japanese planners during the Pacific War (1937-45).

To assuage these concerns, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon has insisted that the United States will maintain alliance commitments and that even reduced U.S. forces are sufficient to help sustain stability in a less threatening international environment. Moreover, since the

number of American military personnel in East Asia constitutes such a small portion of the total U.S. defense budget, they will not be further reduced.²

Tokyo is particularly concerned that its bilateral security ties with the United States remain a prominent regional security emblem despite (or perhaps partly because of) severe economic frictions. Japan remains virtually the only noncommunist Asian state which still sees Russia as a security threat. While the formidable former Soviet Pacific fleet and air force are stationed in the Sea of Okhotsk and northern Sea of Japan, these forces no longer present an imminent threat of invasion. Indeed, they apparently lack resources for even normal exercises. Rather, Japan's emphasis on a continued threat from the north may best be understood as a means of sustaining the U.S. alliance. That alliance still serves as the linchpin in Japan's foreign policy. It reassures the rest of Asia that Japan's commercial dominance will not also expand into political and military hegemony. The U.S. alliance legitimates Japan's foreign economic policy for it insures that Japan will remain an incomplete superpower.³

The end of superpower confrontation has removed a layer of antagonism from other Asian regional disputes which has facilitated their resolution—this time with major power cooperation. The Perm 5 plan for Cambodia's future and prospects for detente between the two Koreas could not have transpired without the concurrence of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China. Vietnam's desire for rapprochement with the PRC and its plans for some kind of association with ASEAN also emerged after Soviet abandonment. China, meanwhile, had completed its new relationship with the ASEAN states in 1990-91 when diplomatic relations were established with Brunei, Indonesia, and Singapore. The common element in all these political changes is the search for prosperity through trade, aid, and investment rather than political and military dominance.

While the United States insists on retaining a western Pacific military presence, which, in turn, is welcomed within the region, these forward deployed forces will increasingly depend on part-time access arrangements in Southeast Asia and direct

financial payments from Japan and the ROK in the north. Japanese and Korean subsidies for American forces in their countries permit the U.S. Government to make the case to Congress that it costs less to maintain these forces forward deployed in the western Pacific than to repatriate them. (In 1992, Tokyo paid almost 50 percent—\$3.5 billion—of the maintenance costs of U.S. forces in Japan.)

Through the early 1990s, Washington has rebuffed Australian, Canadian, and Soviet proposals for new Asian security institutions which would replace the bilateral alliances of the cold war era. U.S. officials have argued that differing security challenges in Northeast and Southeast Asia do not lend themselves to region-wide resolution. Proven bilateral mechanisms should continue to be used to meet specific challenges. Underlying these agreements are Japanese and American concerns that multilateral arrangements will accelerate the departure of U.S. forces from the region.⁴ Nevertheless, if Washington follows its EASI timetable, by the end of the decade there may be no more than 60,000 U.S. troops in East Asia. Indigenous regional arrangements may then become a necessity.

The Northeast Asian Security Environment.

A volatile mix is brewing in Northeast Asia's security future. The combination of U.S. trade frictions with Japan and South Korea combined with increased demands for burdensharing, growing ROK anti-American sentiment and the collapse of the Soviet threat all portend a breakdown in the parallel bilateral security arrangements of the past 40 years. Tokyo and Seoul have relied exclusively on the United States for their defense, though not on each other. Although South Korea and Japan both feared expansionist Communist neighbors, each felt almost equal antipathy toward the other, going back to Japan's brutal occupation of Korea from 1905-45. If the United States were to disengage militarily from the western Pacific, Korean-Japanese relations might well deteriorate as the former foresaw the latter's hegemony. Indeed, the prospect of a militarily ascendant Japan might conceivably lead to a PRC-Korean mainland coalition to balance Japan's maritime

position. The point of these ruminations is to demonstrate that there is no consensus on a revamped security network for the region because there is no commonly perceived threat. Although the United States remains generally welcome—particularly if it foots most of the bill for its own presence—it is unlikely that the region's members are willing to go much beyond their current level of financial contributions to maintain U.S. forces. At some point, using those resources to build their own defense capacities may become more cost-effective, especially since regional defense decisions in a post-cold war setting will be made locally rather than by a global power.

Despite regional anxieties over a dominant Japanese military role sometime in the future, there is little evidence to suggest that Japanese political leaders are moving in that direction. An expansionist policy requires the ability to seize and maintain control of territory on, over, and under the sea, more than 1000 nautical miles (nm) from Japan, for an extended period. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) would also have to transport a significant military force, undertake an opposed landing, and support that force during subsequent action and occupation. In fact, the JSDF is not equipped for any of these tasks. Nor are there plans to build or acquire the equipment to effect them.

Rather, aircraft acquisition plans for the 1990s are designed to enhance Japan's capability for successfully fulfilling its 1980s commitment: to defend the sea and air lanes within 1000 nm of the home islands. New fighters (FSX), AEW, and ASW aircraft, as well as tankers for in-flight refueling, will all add to sea patrol and attack capabilities. Neither bombers nor fixed wing aircraft carriers nor amphibious forces are in Japan's future—all of which would be required for a power projection capability. The Japanese navy's mission continues to be sea lane protection in collaboration with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.⁵

U.S. forces in Japan, meanwhile, no longer serve to protect Japan from attack but rather as the primary location for America's forward deployment in the western Pacific, particularly with the closure of facilities in the Philippines. In the immediate future, these forces provide for contingencies that

could grow from the turmoil in the Russian far east or the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula. Yet, internal Japanese politics could accelerate the reduction of some of these forces. It is unlikely that 20,000 U.S. Marines will remain much longer in Okinawa. A source of tension between Okinawa and Japan's main islands for years, the new governor of the Ryukyus has demanded for the first time an American withdrawal. If effected, a base would be eliminated from which the Marines travelled to the Persian Gulf during DESERT STORM.⁶ Japanese officials more generally, however, continue to insist that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is "the mainstay" of the relationship and "the anchor of peace and stability" in the Asia-Pacific region.⁷

To demonstrate its commitment to America's regional interests, Japan has also downplayed the prospect of an Asian economic grouping under Tokyo's auspices. After months of hesitation, Tokyo rejected Malaysia's offer of membership in a proposed East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) because it excluded the United States. By this action, Japan demonstrated its continued willingness to subordinate its relations with other Asian countries to its predominant U.S. ties. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato explained, the United States should not be excluded from any region-wide economic arrangement because of its important regional security role.⁸ In effect, America's role as a security guarantor should entitle it to participate in any Asian economic group it desires.

Nor has Japan displayed any interest in incorporating Soviet successor authorities into a new regional security regime. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been no more forthcoming on the southern Kurile islands return than was President Gorbachev. Undoubtedly constrained by the negative views toward reversion of Sakhalin *oblast* officials who include the Kuriles within their jurisdiction, Yeltsin has devised a complex, drawn out, five stage negotiating plan. The pace of its implementation may depend on how much aid Japan is prepared to provide Russia. Even if some agreement can be reached on the islands return, the future of some 30,000 Russian residents would also have to be resolved.⁹

Assuming Russian continuation of Soviet East Asian policy, Moscow will probably persevere in suggesting Asian collective security accords along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A region-wide gathering of states, including Russia, would reassert the latter's legitimacy as an Asian actor and serve as a forum to bring pressure on both the United States and Japan for a new understanding on the deployments of naval and air assets around Russia's Asian coast.¹⁰ An understanding that could lead to a reduction of U.S. and Japanese ASW deployments in the northern Sea of Japan would, in turn, permit Russia to continue to lower its military budget and deployments while insuring the safety of its reduced SSBN second strike capability in the Sea of Okhotsk.

As the former Soviet Union recedes from the position of adversary, Japan-ROK relations may become more tense. Thomas Wilborn found in recent interviews with PRC and South Korean defense intellectuals that Japan was now perceived as a potential *new threat to their nations' security*.¹¹ Seoul has gone so far as to identify Japan officially in the ROK 1991-92 National Defense White Paper as bent on developing offensive forces. While Tokyo has tried to reassure the Koreans that the JSDF possesses neither offensive capabilities nor intentions, the ROK, nevertheless, expressed concern over the prospect of Japanese forces participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The ROK Defense Ministry also claimed that, by the end of the 1990s, Japan's defense capacity at its present rate of growth will exceed force levels necessary merely to defend the home islands.¹²

The Korean Peninsula as a Nexus for Northeast Asian Security.

The security concerns of the United States, China, Japan, and the former Soviet Union all converge on Korea's future. Moscow has virtually ceased military and economic aid to Pyongyang and since 1989 has been busily promoting economic and/or political ties with Seoul, Taipei, and the ASEAN states. While Russia has not yet articulated its own East Asia policy, one of Gorbachev's last major proposals for

the region was delivered during his April 1991 visit to Japan. At that time, he suggested a five power collective security system in Asia composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and India—presumably to replace the bilateral treaty arrangements of the cold war. Gorbachev offered an additional suggestion—the creation of a northeast Asian economic development arrangement among the countries bordering the Sea of Japan which could marry Japanese and South Korean capital, management, and technology to North Korean and Chinese labor, and Russian industrial capabilities.¹³ While the latter has elicited some interest from South Korea as a means of further committing Beijing and Moscow to Seoul's continued political progress, none of the other putative members has responded.

The arms control issue that has most concentrated the minds of those states adjacent to Korea has, of course, been the future of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. The threat of an autonomous North Korean nuclear weapon capability has been the focus of concern by Pyongyang's friends and foes alike.¹⁴ The development of these facilities was accelerated in the last half of the 1980s, possibly because of a belief that neither the USSR nor China were reliable backers any longer of the North's unification hopes. Kim Il-song's regime may have concluded that only its own nuclear weapon would be both a sufficient deterrent against an attack from the South—when the latter achieved military superiority sometime early in the next century—as well as a bargaining lever to exact concessions from all its neighbors to improve its economy and sustain its political independence.

Both China and Russia have more to gain from access to South Korean capital and trade than by backing an anachronistic Stalinist ideologue in the North. Korea's future could become the basis for a multilateral collaborative arrangement through which the peninsula's neighbors and the United States underwrite a series of confidence-building measures which lead to arms reductions and, in time, reunification.¹⁵ The initiative must, however, come from the two Koreas. And, indeed, North Korea's apparent compromises during the 1991-92 Korean prime ministerial negotiations

demonstrated that the Korean impasse could be broken before most analysts had thought possible.

The reasons for Pyongyang's sudden flexibility are complex. They may have included an assessment of the performance of U.S. air power and precision-guided munitions in the Persian Gulf which could also be employed against North Korean forces from offshore locations. They may also have grown from the realization that the North's economy could collapse with cataclysmic political results unless outside assistance is obtained. In any event, the December 1991 draft treaty of reconciliation and nonaggression was a precedent-setting event on the peninsula. It will reopen telephone and postal communications between the two states and provide some economic interaction as well. Railroad and road links are also to be constructed across the border. Perhaps most significant of all, Pyongyang and Seoul agree to forswear all acts of terrorism or any effort to overthrow the other.¹⁶

Undoubtedly, Kim Il-song would prefer to accelerate an American military exit from South Korea along with the abrogation of U.S. extended deterrence. Significantly, neither of these stipulations is found in the DPRK-ROK draft treaty. Successful implementation of the accord may well accelerate the timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, however, as well as the transfer of command from American to ROK officers.¹⁷

Interestingly, Washington has pressured the North to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of its nuclear power facilities by threatening to postpone the drawdown of U.S. forces from the South and by increasing the potential lethality of such joint ROK-U.S. exercises as the annual *Team Spirit*. With respect to the latter, Washington has offered to sell Seoul several Patriot missile batteries and to add F-117 Stealth fighters and AWACS aircraft to the 1991 exercise. As a carrot to the North, the United States has agreed to open U.S. bases in Korea to international inspection, though it should be noted that North Korea would still be in easy range of American nuclear submarines.¹⁸

In effect, the North has few strategic options: the Gorbachev-Deng summit of May 1989 combined with Soviet-U.S. rapprochement has removed whatever leverage Pyongyang may have had with its backers. Indicative of the North's weak position are reports that the USSR has not exercised with North Korean forces nor supplied additional modern aircraft (Mig-29s and Su-25s) since 1989 and that Moscow is now demanding immediate payment in hard currency for any new weapons sales.¹⁹ Moreover, without Soviet logistics assistance, there is some question about whether these modern systems will remain workable.

Arms control makes sense for North Korea. Abandoned by the former Soviet Union, the cost of maintaining an army of one million in one of the world's poorest economies has exhausted the DPRK. Facing external debts estimated to be \$5 billion, stagnant foreign trade, and with a GNP of only \$47 billion, the South's economic, population, and technological superiority will prevail over time if the current confrontation continues. The North needs a respite if its regime is to survive.

The Autumn 1991 decision by the United States and ROK to withdraw American tactical nuclear weapons from the South offered the DPRK a way to reciprocate through IAEA inspections without losing face. When President Roh Tae-wu promised the North that the ROK would never develop nuclear weapons on its own, a path was opened for both governments to permit international inspection of their respective nuclear facilities. As an additional incentive, President Bush, in his January 1992 visit to Seoul, offered to cancel *Team Spirit* for that year if the North opened its nuclear plants to international scrutiny.²⁰ The only caveats to these promising developments are the possibility that the North has already produced and hidden enough plutonium to produce one or more bombs and that the IAEA experience in Iraq provides little assurance that international inspectors can locate all the facilities designed for the production of nuclear weapons materials if the host government chooses to hide them.

Defense ties between the United States and South Korea have expanded into burdensharing and joint production over the past decade. By 1995, Seoul has agreed to provide about

one-third of the won-based costs maintaining approximately 31,000 American forces on the peninsula. That would amount to about \$300 million annually.²¹ Nevertheless, there are both political and economic limits to this relationship.

Given an increasingly open democracy in the South and declining tension with the North, political priorities will change. Resources will be shifted from the defense budget to welfare expenditures. The termination of the National Defense Tax in 1990 may be the harbinger of a new age.²² While the United States has agreed to coproduction in the \$4 billion General Dynamics F-16C/D contract, the U.S. aerospace industry is beginning to have the same kinds of concerns about future Korean competition that it has had for some time about Japan. ROK officials have complained that the United States has been reluctant to transfer defense technology despite a memorandum of understanding signed in 1988. The ROK has posited a turn to Europe or Russia as an alternative if Washington continues to hold back on coproduction arrangements and technology transfer. In military trade for 1990, the ROK ran a \$1.6 billion deficit with the United States.²³

In sum, the end of the cold war, the prospect of detente on the Korean peninsula, growing democracy and anti-American sentiment in the South, as well as bilateral trade frictions, do not portend a continued smooth U.S.-ROK relationship. South Korea lacks an obvious resource asset such as oil. Under these conditions, Korean political leaders may reasonably ask what long-term stake America has in their country's future for the post-cold war era other than strategic denial and the protection of Japan—both increasingly outdated objectives.

Transitional Arrangements for Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia's strategic importance to the United States during the cold war was based on its location astride the sea lanes between the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf and the northwest Pacific. The Philippine bases provided U.S. naval and air forces with a surge capability in either direction. As in Northeast Asia, American defense relationships have been bilateral with the Philippines and Thailand, though the Five

Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) incorporates Malaysia and Singapore with Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand in a parallel security structure.

The future of these arrangements is increasingly problematic, however, as the former Soviet naval and air forces withdraw from the region and Vietnamese troops leave Cambodia. In a more relaxed security environment, U.S. forces will serve less as primary defender of the region and more to reassure and share in the burden of promoting its defense. Equally important, Southeast Asian states want to insure that the United States remains involved economically, as an important trade and investment partner.

Indicative of this new, reduced role has been Washington's acquiescence to the closure of the Philippine bases by the end of 1992. Although hoping to keep the bases open until 1994, the United States preferred a rapid phaseout to the prospect of Philippine control over the exit. Without the bases superb location and repair facilities, there is no doubt that the size and duration of U.S. deployments in Southeast Asia will be reduced as forces are relocated to the mid-Pacific, Japan, and Alaska. Nevertheless, in all probability, these forces would have been diminished even if the Philippine bases had remained in operation because of the altered threat environment and defense budget cutbacks.

The United States is searching for facilities to replace Subic Bay's ship repair and Crow Valley's air-ground training range. Their loss not only affects U.S. forward deployed forces but also those of a number of Southeast Asian states which trained at the Philippine facilities. Navy officials have been negotiating with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei for training, repair, and access arrangements. These prospects include ship and aircraft maintenance on a commercial basis in Surabaya in Indonesia and Lumut on Malaysia's peninsular west coast. Indonesia and Singapore have proposed the construction of a new air combat range on Sumatra which could be ready by 1995 and available to other regional air forces.²⁴ Malaysian authorities, meanwhile, have stated that repair arrangements at Lumut could provide employment for Subic Bay's skilled Filipino workers if Malaysians lack sufficient expertise.²⁵

As the United States reduces its regional presence, ASEAN militaries are increasing their own capabilities for external defense, expanding beyond their traditional counterinsurgency orientation. Least able to undertake this new task is the Philippines. Its armed forces had estimated it would take \$7 billion in new appropriations for modernization over a 10-year period that would cover the gamut from fast patrol craft to interdict smuggling to armed helicopters for counterinsurgency and combat aircraft and airlift capacity to defend the islands' air and sea space as well as its claims in the Spratly chain. With the U.S. exit, however, the resource base for these modernization plans also disappears.²⁶

Other more affluent ASEAN states fare better in their modernization plans. Tiny Singapore is acquiring new missile corvettes to better defend adjacent sea lanes. Its air force includes eight F-16s and a much larger number of A-4 Super Skyhawks which have been upgraded with new engines and avionics. Particularly significant are Singaporean plans to acquire new radars for an enhanced C³I capability. When integrated with command and control centers, Singapore will be able to monitor traffic all along the Malacca Strait and into the South China Sea.²⁷

Thailand, too, is seeking to develop a greater maritime capability along both its Gulf and Andaman Sea coasts. To enhance its coastal patrol and oil rig defense, the Thai navy is acquiring four Chinese frigates, which although equipped with only 1950s technology, should be adequate for surveillance. (The four Chinese ships cost the equivalent of one modern European vessel.)²⁸ Thailand is also buying P-3 aircraft through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program for EEZ patrol. This naval upgrade will enhance Thailand's ability to operate along both its coasts while still leaving outer Gulf and South China Sea SLOC defense to the U.S. Seventh Fleet.²⁹ Thailand's continued security cooperation with the United States was revealed when former prime minister Chatichai Chunnhawan acknowledged that his government permitted U.S. planes to use U-Tapao air base as a staging point in the Gulf War.³⁰

Malaysia plans to allocate \$2.2 billion to defense between 1991 and 1995, 11 percent of its budget. This is a 400 percent increase over its previous 5-year plan. Under a 1988 agreement with Great Britain, most of these funds will go for 28 Hawk aircraft, two missile corvettes, the construction of new bases, and possibly the purchase of two submarines.³¹

Enhanced regional defense cooperation is also planned. The FPDA is expanding its integrated air defense system to include east as well as west Malaysia. Brunei has been asked to join. Malaysia and Indonesia have begun joint surveillance of the Malacca Strait. And U.S. officials have proposed greater access for their ships and aircraft on a temporary basis to increase joint training exercises.³² None of this portends a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the western Pacific even without the Philippine bases, though plans do suggest more intermittent deployments.

Why No ASEAN Defense Community?

A number of ASEAN leaders in recent years have speculated about the prospects for region-wide defense cooperation. Interest in expanding bilateral defense exercises has grown as ASEAN states acquire more power projection capabilities and as the former Soviet Union and United States reduce their forces in the area. While ASEAN may be a *security community* in the sense that no member would seriously consider the use of force against another to settle disputes, it has not and will not become a *defense community*. Common cultural, ideological, and historical experiences are absent; and most importantly, there is no common threat. The benefits ASEAN has achieved—relative peace, stability, and security—do not form the base for wider military collaboration. Rather, they allow each state to pursue an independent path.

Despite parallel efforts to increase their external defense capabilities, ASEAN leaderships continue to define their security futures through economic development and cooperation rather than through a military pact. In the 1970s and 1980s, a common defense arrangement was rejected for fear that it would only encourage countermeasures by Vietnam

and the Soviet Union and that external defense was irrelevant for addressing internal threats of insurgency, ethnic separatism, and political dissent. Moreover, the overall military weakness of the ASEAN states made them dependent on Western security guarantees. A mutual defense pact would have had little deterrent value.

In recent years, although the security environment has changed radically, interest in a defense pact has not increased. Communist insurgencies have collapsed in Southeast Asia (with the partial exception of the Philippines). Joint exercises and training on a bilateral basis emphasizing conventional military threats have increased. However, there is little impetus from the regional environment to move beyond these modest informal arrangements. The naval and air forces of the former Soviet Union are moving back to the North Pacific. Moscow's alliance with Vietnam has all but ended, with Hanoi now seeking political and economic cooperation with ASEAN rather than confronting the region militarily. China, too, has normalized relations with both the ASEAN states and Indochina. In sum, Southeast Asia's security environment has never seemed more benign.

Small wonder, then, that there is scant interest among the ASEAN states to remedy the lack of interoperability in their armed forces because of differences in doctrine, language, training procedures, and logistics systems. Divergent strategic priorities between, for example, Singapore's forward defense out to the South China Sea and Indonesia's defense in depth or Thailand's primary orientation toward land-based threats versus Malaysia's maritime focus render multilateral cooperation problematic at best.³³

Under these conditions, no ASEAN state perceives indigenous cooperative defense arrangements as preferable to the maintenance of external ties through the FPDA, the Manila Pact, and, in the case of Thailand, continued links to China. Malaysia's Defense Minister has noted that his country and Singapore have been able to exercise effectively and develop common procedures through the FPDA. That capability might not have emerged in the absence of outside arrangements. On the other hand, a trilateral straits defense

regime among Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia could have the negative effect of dividing ASEAN into maritime and land-oriented subgroups. Minister Mohammed Abdul Rajak also foresaw the prospects of greater Chinese, Japanese, and Indian naval activity in Southeast Asia as reasons why the ASEAN states should retain their own linkages to external guarantors.³⁴ Moreover, should Vietnam and the other Indochina states affiliate with ASEAN by the end of the decade, association-wide defense collaboration would seem even more unwieldy.

Although defense collaboration with Vietnam would appear out of the question, its contribution to ASEAN's economic diplomacy could be considerable. Vietnam's membership could also facilitate a peaceful resolution to overlapping EEZs in the South China Sea. Continental shelf disputes could be settled comprehensively, not just bilaterally. And, an ASEAN which included Vietnam could enhance Southeast Asia's bargaining position in dealing with the regionalization of the global economy.

Finally, it should be noted that even in a post-cold war world, new regional tensions arise. China's involvement in supporting the repressive military regime in Burma is a case in point. Burma's army is entirely dependent for its equipment on Beijing; and northern Burma's economy is reportedly under China's domination. PRC aid to Rangoon's military leaders could add to Southeast Asian security problems by exacerbating refugee flows into Thailand and Bangladesh.³⁵

Conclusion.

Forecasting regional security arrangements in Asia is a speculative enterprise indeed. On the one hand, political inertia and past sunk costs in military investment, represented, for example, by U.S. carrier battle groups, suggest the continuation of forward deployed American naval and air forces. These forces would be assisted through access arrangements with a number of friendly states along the Asian littoral. On the other hand, modern-day elements of power are increasingly based on economic performance, technological

know-how, and capacity for innovation. Military capabilities play a secondary role in this new environment. In fact, high levels of military investment may actually slow a country's general economic growth and harm its competitive performance. The irony of these conditions for America's Asian policy is that while most members of the region will continue to welcome a U.S. presence which contributes to stability by dampening indigenous arms races, the United States itself has concluded that its deployments must be reduced as part of an overall revitalization of the U.S. economy.

The Soviet Union's collapse has meant that the ideological basis for U.S. commitments in Asia has evaporated. While regional conflicts remain in Korea, between Japan and Russia, China and Taiwan, and among the Southeast Asian states over boundaries and maritime development zones, these disputes are endemic and do not require the intervention of external powers for resolution. Nor do they threaten vital American interests. Regardless of their outcomes, no new regional hegemon will emerge which may threaten international commerce or block U.S. investments.³⁶

This is not to deny that residual U.S. commitments to Korea should be abrogated while the Stalinist Kim Il-song regime survives. By the end of the decade, however, rapprochement between the two Koreas and/or drastic political changes in the North attendant upon a successor regime or economic collapse could lead to new arms control measures which would greatly alter the need for U.S. forces. Should Korea be unified by the century's end, it may still desire a U.S. presence to protect against a rearmed Japan. The same reasoning suggests that both China and Korea would prefer the continuation of American bases in Japan rather than the latter's development of an autonomous naval and air power projection capability.

In Southeast Asia, even though the Spratly islands remain a potential flashpoint, resolution through armed hostilities seems improbable. A joint development regime involving all claimants may be on the horizon or, at minimum, separate national consolidations of each country's holdings. Even were China to decide to acquire the Spratly islands through naval

and air attacks—an unlikely prospect—the ASEAN states possess neither the capability nor training to repulse them. While collective military action would not occur, collective diplomacy, based on the Cambodian experience, probably would. ASEAN's past diplomatic successes will sustain its political cohesion for some purposes, while security cooperation operates at a lower level—between and among contiguous states.

Vietnam could affiliate with a loose ASEAN political group, adding to regional reconciliation. It is improbable, however, that Vietnam will become a full member of ASEAN while the SRV remains a Leninist state with a centrally planned economy. Compatible political and economic values would simply be lacking. More probable will be Vietnam's participation in a Southeast Asian balance of power which would place it as the northern continental pole opposite Indonesia at the southern flank.³⁷ Moreover, with the cessation of Soviet military aid to Vietnam, its military's deterioration will degrade Hanoi's threat potential in the region over time.

In sum, ASEAN defense cooperation will remain at the level of regular consultations and the exchange of intelligence and some training among its members; joint exercises among neighbors primarily for border control, antipiracy and antismuggling purposes; notification of national exercises particularly in border regions; and the development of border agreements to cope with both land and sea-based illegal labor movements and contraband. Southeast Asian defense, then, will remain at the state rather than regional level. In an environment no longer dominated by cold war ideological conflicts and extraregional alliances, the impetus for *regional* defense collaboration atrophies. While ASEAN will continue to function as a regional political and economic consultative mechanism, it should not be expected to become Southeast Asia's NATO or even its Conference on Security Cooperation.

The foregoing assessment of regional security for Asia in a post-cold war environment yields several conclusions about the future of collective security and U.S. forward presence:

(1) No collective security pact for either Northeast or Southeast Asia is on the horizon, much less an Asia-wide organization. For the foreseeable future, no single Asian state or combination of actors is perceived to threaten either the territorial integrity of others or international sea lanes. The absence of any clear threat, then, precludes the necessity for new, multilateral defense arrangements.

(2) Nevertheless, security problems will persist in overlapping EEZs, competitive claims to the Spratly Islands, illegal migration, and maritime resource disputes, as well as in the uncertainty over Korea's political future, and the prospect of nuclear weapons development on that peninsula. Most of these issues are exclusively local and can only be resolved by the affected states. Outside powers have little substantive interest in them—with the exception of Korea—unless an outbreak of hostilities would threaten international commerce. A continued U.S. naval and air presence, then, can no longer be justified by reference to an overarching great power menace.

(3) Rather, the maintenance of reduced U.S. air, naval, and army deployments in Asia will depend on a series of mutually beneficial bilateral agreements which also have the concurrence of neighboring states. Periodic access, prepositioned supplies, and regular joint exercises will probably characterize U.S. arrangements in Southeast Asia, initially with Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei. Over time, similar agreements might be reached with Malaysia and Indonesia—incentives for Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta being additional business for some of their shipyards. These exercises should focus on assisting regional armed services in developing their own capacities to monitor and defend their maritime and airspaces. The broader U.S. role would be one of patrolling the international waters and airspaces along the western Pacific littoral in collaboration with the region's members.

(4) Finally, a sustained, though reduced, U.S. presence in Japan, Korea (for the time being), and along the sea and air routes of Southeast Asia probably inhibits efforts by Japan, China, or India to move their forces into the region to meet their

own extended security needs. That is, reliance on an American presence dampens the prospect of a regional arms race and reduces the probability that Japan might add a military dimension to its economic dominance in Asia.

A nagging question remains: Can the United States afford this new *constabulary* role? In all probability, only if those states involved in these relationships are willing to share some of the burdens. Both Korea and Japan already provide direct financial subsidation for U.S. forces in their countries. While the Southeast Asian states are less affluent, if they are willing to provide access arrangements without rental costs, that, too, would be a form of burdensharing and would assist the United States in helping the Asian littoral promote international stability through this transitional era in world politics.

The era of *Pax Americana* has ended in Asia. New collaborative arrangements can, however, foster an international environment conducive to trade, investment, and economic growth. As a dominant trading state, the United States should be an integral part of these new arrangements, though it may no longer dominate them.

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CHAPTER 3

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COALITION STRATEGIES

Douglas T. Stuart

Introduction.

This chapter represents a self-conscious intrusion into the territory staked out by Inis Claude's essay. I enter into this territory with more than a little trepidation, and justified humility, since Professor Claude is the closest thing that the International Relations community has to a "definitive source" on issues relating to collective security and collective defense. I nonetheless feel that I have no choice but to confront these concepts directly, in order to consider the prospects for European security in a post-cold war world.

The title of my chapter conjoins two terms—*coalition* and *alliance*—which are not identical. A coalition is a temporary and conditional form of mutual defense agreement between governments, based upon "momentary convenience or necessity," which may or may not be formalized in a treaty between the participants.¹ By contrast, Warren Kimball defines alliances as "...formal agreements between nations which call for specific joint action and responses to a given political situation."² Kimball emphasizes the greater reliability, clarity and endurance of alliances by comparison to coalitions. To illustrate: I consider the anti-German pact of World War II to be a coalition and I consider NATO to be an alliance. This small distinction is worth making at the outset, because in the post-cold war situation we are likely to see a resurgence of coalition politics in Eastern Europe, at the same time that Washington is engaged in discussions with key West European governments about the future of the NATO Alliance.

I consider both coalitions and alliances to be forms of *collective defense* or *collective self-defense*, which I take to mean an outward-looking agreement for mutual security between two or more governments, in which the threat from outside may or may not be explicitly named. I will be contrasting all of these concepts with the idea of *collective security*, which I take to mean an inward-looking agreement by more than two governments to preserve peace. Professor Claude dates the concept from the League experiment after World War I, and notes that in its original form it was envisioned as

...a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions to enforce the peace.³

To illustrate: I consider Articles 39 through 50 of the Charter of the United Nations as a model commitment to collective security.

Background.

The anti-Communist containment system of the cold war was the most successful experiment in collective defense in the history of international relations. It was a particular form of collective defense, and it operated under particular conditions, which had much to do with its success. The defining characteristic of the system was a network of bilateral and multilateral alliances which were essentially American protectorates. At the core of this network of protectorates was U.S. military power, and, in particular, America's nuclear deterrent. For a period of over four decades it succeeded in guaranteeing the security of the United States and the principal members of the OECD community, while wearing down the Soviet Union and ultimately contributing to its collapse. It is worth reminding ourselves of how close both the process and the outcome were to the ideal vision of containment which was articulated by George Kennan in the formative period of the

cold war. Kennan's frequently quoted call for "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" was based upon the author's assumption that such a policy would lead ultimately to "either the break-up or the mellowing of Soviet power." Kennan argued that this goal could be achieved without an East-West war, because the USSR could not "...face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs."⁴ In spite of the periodic excesses and aberrations of containment, and notwithstanding Kennan's own revisionism, few critics today can find fault with either the logic or the consistency of America's overall strategy of collective defense during the cold war.

It is also worth reminding ourselves of how different this arrangement was than the system of international security formulated by Washington, London and Moscow during the latter stages of World War II. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were all, to varying degrees, supportive of a worldwide system of collective security. And after much intra and inter-governmental haggling, all three agreed that the new global order should take precedence over, but not block the creation of regional approaches to security. Churchill and Stalin had initially preferred a system which accorded more status and influence to regional security arrangements—because they believed that a regionalized system would be more conducive to the establishment of British and Soviet dominance over Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Under pressure from Washington, however, London and Moscow accepted a universalist approach in which regional security arrangements were to play a (vaguely defined) subsidiary role.

FDR's opposition to a region-based system was greatly influenced by his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hull's reasons for opposing regionalism are worth mentioning, because they may prove to be prophetic in a post-cold war setting. The Secretary of State warned that a regionalized world order would encourage the creation of continental blocs over which the United States would have limited influence; create a situation in which inter-regional conflicts might arise; invite the scramble for regional dominance by local powers;

and, lead to a sense of frustration in the United States which would fuel isolationist impulses.⁵

In any event, the universalist system of collective security which was institutionalized in the United Nations was rapidly eclipsed by the reality of bipolar collective defense. The transition from collective security to collective defense was epitomized by the creation of NATO in 1949—officially under the auspices of the United Nations, but in reality independent of, and stronger than, the UN. In the words of Robert Hildebrand:

The vocabulary of peace, so often employed during the war, had been replaced by the language of national security.... With NATO, as opposed to the United Nations, the conflicting security needs of the United States and the Soviet Union would no longer be a problem...the contradictions posed by the need for cooperation between two such different systems were resolved by institutionalizing the conflicts between them.⁶

Thus, the cold war was characterized by a *de facto* system of collective defense which took precedence over the *de jure* commitment to collective security. At times, such as during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the two approaches to peacekeeping came into conflict. But the Western allies never lost sight of the priority that they accorded to collective defense. The cold war was also characterized by a *de facto* form of regionalism which took precedence over the *de jure* commitment to universalism. In spite of the rhetoric of global anti-Communist containment, the American-sponsored security network was essentially regionalized, with Europe representing the most fully developed and most important regional component.

Washington did dabble from time to time with the idea of trans-regional security linkages. Three examples were: the attempt to create a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) which would ultimately be linked to NATO; plans for using Turkey as a strategic bridge between NATO and the Baghdad Pact (subsequently CENTO); and, discussions with London, Canberra and Wellington about the practicality of linking NATO to ANZUS.⁷ In general, however, it was politically, militarily and administratively easier for Washington to develop bilateral or

regional security arrangements which were complimentary but not combined. This regionalization is best illustrated by the history of NATO "out-of-area" disputes—disagreements between NATO allies over issues beyond the established treaty area. These disagreements about extra-European issues were often intensely recriminatory, but they were never allowed to disrupt the regional collective defense agreement between Washington and its North Atlantic allies.⁸

By the mid-1980s, however, the "Trans-Atlantic bargain" was exhibiting strains which seemed to portend a crisis. First, and most importantly, the U.S. nuclear guarantee, which had been the core of the bargain since 1949, had become increasingly suspect since the late 1960s—when the Soviet Union reached its goal of rough strategic parity with the United States. And nothing that Washington could do from that point onward, short of the unacceptable option of giving the European allies positive control over the U.S. nuclear decision, could reassure Washington's allies. This was an *absolute* measure of American decline in the international system. Second, Washington's status and influence within the NATO alliance was also undermined by its *relative* economic decline, which was exacerbated in the early 1980s by the Reagan Administration's ambitious program of defense spending. Thus, burdensharing, which had become the most divisive issue within NATO by the mid 1970s, took on a more serious and more threatening tone by the mid 1980s. As a result of these and other structural changes within the Alliance, Washington's allies were actively searching for alternatives to NATO by the mid 1980s.

Concern about the long-term reliability of the NATO Alliance was strongest in Germany, which had the most to lose by failure of the U.S. deterrent and the most to gain by an end to the cold war. Small wonder, then, that the Soviet vision of a "common European house" which was advanced in the mid-1980s generated more excitement in Germany (a "Gorbasm" according to *The Economist* magazine) than in any other West European country. By this time, Bonn was already pretty far down the road toward redefining its security relationship with Washington, and with NATO. In particular, the

Germans worked closely with the French during the 1980s to resuscitate the moribund Western European Union (WEU) and to use it as a U.S.-approved umbrella under which Paris and Bonn were able to work out new plans for bilateral defense cooperation. Bonn also began to take greater responsibility for its fate within NATO itself, as illustrated by its more assertive voice within the Alliance and its campaign to place Manfred Worner in the position of NATO Secretary General. This new German assertiveness within NATO (and the EC) generated concern and resentment among many constituencies in Western Europe.

For its part, Paris was anxious to collaborate with Bonn on defense issues in the mid-1980s not only out of concern about the long-term reliability of NATO but also out of a desire to increase its influence over German defense decisions at a time when Germany was becoming increasingly restive. These considerations were sufficient to convince Francois Mitterrand to place in question one of the basic tenets of Gaullism, the indivisibility of the nuclear decision, by agreeing in 1986 to consult with Bonn before employing French tactical nuclear weapons on German soil.⁹

Evidence of a developing Franco-German axis fueled suspicions in London and Washington about the direction that European foreign and defense cooperation appeared to be taking. The concept of a European pillar had been publicly applauded by these governments throughout the cold war, precisely because its implications were vague and its prospects remote. By the mid-1980s, however, the European pillar had begun to take form, and the Anglo-Saxons had begun to take notice. Fortunately, the allies were spared a confrontation by the collapse of the Soviet bloc.¹⁰

Europe's Future: Between "Europax" and Hobbesian Anarchy.

This brief survey of the last years of the cold war illustrates that fundamental aspects of the current Trans-Atlantic security debate preexisted by several years the collapse of the Berlin Wall. But this is not to imply that there is nothing unique about

the post-cold war era. The end of the cold war has done more than accelerate the process of construction of a European Pillar. It has transformed the intra-European debate about the risks involved in transcending NATO, and about the preconditions for the success of any new institutional arrangement.

The wave of Europhoria which swept the continent after the collapse of the Soviet bloc encouraged journalists and policy makers to exaggerate the prospects for peace in a post-cold war world and to downplay the costs and risks. During this early celebratory stage, very few magazines or journals shared *The Economist's* curmudgeonly perspective that "The dream of Europax" was only for the "wishful minded" and that "Europe and peace have not been words that naturally run together."¹¹ As reality has descended upon the continent over the last year, however, there has been an overreaction. Extreme pessimism has replaced extreme optimism in many journalistic analyses of the prospects for peace in Europe.

Fortunately, most of the scholarly discussion about Europe's future falls between these two extremes, and the principal points of reference in this discussion are institutions. A strategy for successfully combining these institutions will have to be based upon two things: an appreciation of the potential for mutual reinforcement and mutual antagonism between and among these institutions, and an appreciation of the relative merits of collective defense and collective security as guides in the formulation of an architectonic vision.

Four institutions are usually mentioned in any discussion of the prospects for a future European order—NATO, the European Communities (EC), the WEU, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). I will add the United Nations to this list, because it provides the legal framework for all of these institutions and, more importantly, because it is likely to play a much more direct and influential role in European affairs in the future.

NATO.

NATO deserves to be considered first, because it is still the cornerstone of European security. Support for the preservation of NATO extends well beyond the current membership of the Alliance. Indeed, some members of the former Warsaw Pact have expressed a desire to join NATO, in order to bolster their security and cement their ties with the Atlantic Community. The most obvious reason for NATO's popularity during the last 18 months is that it has provided reassurance to European governments confronted with a major war in the Persian Gulf; an attempted coup in, and the subsequent collapse of, the Soviet Union; and a civil war in Yugoslavia.

NATO has also performed two less visible functions. First, it has provided an institutional framework for continued ties with an increasingly frustrated Turkey. Since the end of the cold war there has been a tendency on the part of several European governments to distance themselves from Turkey, because they have too many other issues to deal with and because Turkey is seen as an "inconvenient" ally. It is a very large (58 million) and relatively poor (\$1,350 per capita GNP) nation with an abysmal record in the field of human rights. And despite nearly 70 years of secularization, it has a population which is 98 percent Moslem. As long as the Soviet threat persisted, Turkey was welcomed into the Atlantic Community and encouraged to believe that its contribution to the common defense would ultimately be rewarded by full membership in the European Community. Now that the Soviet threat has evaporated, key European governments are reconsidering the prospect of Turkish membership in the EC, or else seeking to skirt the issue altogether. Worse, from Ankara's perspective, these governments are consolidating Greece's participation in the EC, including Greek participation in new arrangements for foreign and defense policy coordination. Thus Turkish policy makers foresee a time in the not too distant future when disagreements between Greece and Turkey will become disputes between the EC and Turkey, to the considerable disadvantage of Ankara. For the present, at least, NATO provides an alternative to this situation, and by doing so it has

helped to calm Ankara's fears and discourage radical tendencies within the domestic politics of Turkey.¹²

Second, the Alliance has provided the context within which Europe has adjusted to the process of German unification. As previously mentioned, European concern about the growth of German power began to surface well before the cold war ended. But once the process of East-West German reconciliation got under way, old fears and resentments returned with a vengeance. One need only consider the overreaction of many East and West European governments to Helmut Kohl's waffling on the issue of the Polish-German border to realize that Germany is still considered a suspect nation on the continent. More recently, Germany has been pilloried for taking the lead on the question of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, in spite of the fact that the Germans have gone out of their way during the last 2 years to demonstrate their commitment to European cooperation—not only in the field of economics but in foreign and defense affairs as well. NATO has been indispensable in keeping such reactions under control during the last 2 years, by keeping the United States politically and militarily involved in European affairs, and by providing Bonn with a forum for discussion and coordination of its policies. It is safe to say that both the process of unification and the subsequent process of German self-definition within Central Europe would have been more difficult and tendentious without the NATO Alliance.

For these and other reasons, no European governments are anxious to see NATO disappear soon. In fact, to judge by new applications for membership, NATO has never been more popular. This is why George Bush had no reason to be concerned when he made his "love us or tell us to leave" speech to the NATO allies during the November 1991 summit in Rome. It remains to be seen, however, whether a future American president will get the same reassuring response from all NATO allies 5 years from now. Since the answer to this question will be largely determined by the alternatives available to European governments, I will return to it after surveying the other institutions mentioned above.

The EC and the WEU.

One of the most common criticisms of NATO is that it is an artifact of the cold war, and therefore inappropriate for the politics of the "common European house." What is less appreciated, however, is the extent to which the European Community is no less rooted in the cold war era. The EC benefitted from the artificial, hothouse environment provided by the Atlantic Community. The normal workings of the security dilemma were suppressed in Western Europe by both American hegemony and Soviet intimidation. For the EC this meant that economic and political cooperation was encouraged by U.S. sponsorship and by the absence of intra-European disputes and suspicions over relative defense budgets. Furthermore, American anti-imperialism and exclusionary unilateralism in the Third World combined with Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact community to foreclose traditional areas of West European competition—Central Europe, the Balkans and the southern littoral of the Mediterranean. The result was an unnaturally introspective Western Europe, which concentrated most of its political and economic attention inwardly. The end of the cold war has eliminated these artificial barriers. West European governments are rediscovering traditional interests and concerns beyond the European Community. The Persian Gulf War was the first intimation of this changed situation. More recently, France has begun to get the message in the wake of the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. Germany's geostrategic placement assures that it will be far ahead of its EC partners in economic and political relations with Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise Italy's location insures that it will be more involved than other EC governments with developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

These centrifugal pressures are already being felt by the EC, and they will become stronger in the next couple of years. But they are not likely to lead to the collapse of the EC experiment, because the process of West European economic integration is already too far along. The hothouse has disappeared, but the EC has already developed into a strong

and productive economic entity that can survive in the new environment. Even Britain, which has been a disgruntled member of the EC since it joined in 1973, is too far down the road toward European economic union to gamble on an alternative. Furthermore, key European governments have foreseen the problems mentioned above and have been encouraging an acceleration and expansion of the process of EC development in order to preempt some of these problems. This is best illustrated by France and Germany's support for the recent EC summit at Maastricht, which moved the Community much closer to full economic and monetary union.

But EC governments did more than accelerate the process of economic cooperation at Maastricht. They committed the Community to move toward "...the eventual framing of a common defence policy..." and the creation of a new EC foreign policy secretariat in Brussels as a step toward an institutionalized common EC foreign policy. Here, the Community is moving into new territory, and may fall victim to the fissiparous forces discussed above. Some experts and policy makers have argued that there is an inevitable spillover from close economic integration to close cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and defense. But there is no empirical evidence to support this claim (understandable in view of the fact that the EC is an unprecedented experiment in international cooperation).¹³ It seems more likely that West European governments will settle for a flexible system of consultation and coordination on issues of foreign policy and defense; a system which permits common action on the basis of consensus without doing violence to the residual sovereign control which the separate Community members currently exercise over these issues. This would be a more efficient version of what currently exists within the EC, rather than a qualitatively different and more supranational arrangement. It envisions not a Europe in which progress in economic integration gradually pulls EC members towards political and defense cooperation—but rather a Europe in which management of the tension between close economic integration and more conditional cooperation in foreign and defense affairs becomes the defining characteristic of intra-Community relations.

The WEU is the institutional framework within which EC governments will coordinate their defense policies in the future. WEU Secretary General Dr. Willem van Eekelen and his predecessor Dr. Alfred Cahen deserve much of the credit for having positioned this institution to play a central role in European security. Indeed, the WEU is the greatest bureaucratic success story of the last few years. Less than a decade ago it was a footnote in the almanac of European institutions. But by making itself useful—as an umbrella for Franco-German defense discussions in the late 1980s and as a forum for European consultation and coordination in support of both the 1987-88 Persian Gulf Armada and the 1990-91 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—the WEU gained considerable respect and influence. The price of success has been visibility, however, as both NATO and the EC (or, more precisely, Washington and Paris) have begun to struggle for control over this bit of institutional turf. But the EC has a natural advantage in this tug-of-war, since the WEU is by definition a "European Pillar" organization. Washington would be well advised to accept this fact and support the growth of the WEU within the EC framework.

As this European Pillar evolves, it is likely to become harder to make the case for the indispensability of NATO, particularly if the WEU begins to develop a record of success in the defense field. NATO governments will have to give the Alliance some new roles and responsibilities. Before considering this challenge, however, it is necessary to consider the other candidate for the title of institutional guarantor of European order—the CSCE.

The CSCE: Victim of Circumstance.

Of the institutions discussed in this paper, only the CSCE can claim to be a true "post-cold war" organization. For although it has been around since 1973 its membership is pan-European and its structure is multilateral rather than bloc-to-bloc. This is why, as the cold war system began to collapse there was considerable interest in the CSCE, particularly among those governments that were situated along the fault lines of the old order (Germany and the nations

of Central Europe). The campaign to build up the CSCE was smothered, however, by American ambivalence (because it saw the CSCE as a threat to NATO) and by French reticence (because it preferred to sponsor the EC as the cornerstone of the new European order). As a result, the CSCE has acquired a minimal institutional identity over the last 2 years, but unlike the WEU it has not contributed in any significant way to the resolution of European security problems. This is most apparent in the cases of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Arguably both of these issues could have been ideal opportunities for the CSCE to begin to establish itself as a valuable part of the European peace system because its purview extends to such issues as the validation of frontiers, conflict prevention, confidence and security building, and the protection of human rights. Furthermore, at the same time that the CSCE was demonstrating its irrelevance to these serious problems, NATO was beginning to adjust both its geographical and its functional identity in ways that made the CSCE look more and more dispensable. NATO's November 1991 Rome Declaration pays considerable lip service to the CSCE, while at the same time committing the Alliance to such activities as "dialogue," "cooperation," and "management of crises and conflict prevention" anywhere in Europe. The allies also created a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for confidence building and consultation between NATO governments and the members of the former Warsaw Pact. Not to be outdone, the EC has also begun to cut into the defining responsibilities of the CSCE, by establishing standards for recognizing new states and by involving itself directly in the Yugoslavian crisis. Under these circumstances even the most ardent supporters of the CSCE, such as Czech and Slovak President Václav Havel, have begun to lose interest in this institution.

It can be argued that the future of European security would be more secure if a strong CSCE had come into existence as soon as the Berlin Wall came down. But this no longer appears to be a possibility. What is more likely now is that the CSCE, the only "true" post-cold war European security institution, will play only a very marginal role in Europe's future, while NATO and the EC/WEU (the leading residual cold war institutions)

compete, or cooperate, to shape the post-cold war European system. We can now turn our attention to this problem.

Redefining NATO as a Pan-European Institution.

My analysis of the evolving security situation in Europe has highlighted four points. First, NATO is currently enjoying wide popularity. Second, the debate about "ownership" of the WEU is likely to increasingly favor the EC over NATO, with the result that a stronger European defense identity will take shape. Third, as a European Pillar of defense develops, NATO governments will have to find new rationales for preserving the Alliance. Fourth and finally, the first tentative steps in this direction have already been taken at the 1991 Rome Summit, where NATO governments decided to extend the Alliance's political purview into Eastern Europe and to intrude into some of the CSCE's areas of responsibility. Under these circumstances, the proper course of action for NATO would seem to be to push forward with the preemption of the CSCE and to replace it as the preeminent pan-European institution for political cooperation, collective security, pacific settlement and peaceful change. For purposes of discussion, these new functions might come under the auspices of the recently created North Atlantic Cooperation Council. While preserving its core of members committed to collective defense, NATO could offer membership in the NACC to all of the nations of the CSCE, and establish guidelines (similar to those recently developed by the EC) for the recognition of new states and their inclusion in this larger NACC system. A side benefit of distinguishing between the NATO core and the new NACC system is that there will be no need to confront the problems associated with changing the NATO Treaty or changing NATO's established geographic boundaries. This strategy would place the NATO/NACC system firmly within the context of the United Nations, as a pan-European peacekeeping organization. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, NATO already derives its legitimacy from the UN, as reflected in the Preamble and Articles 1, 5 and 7 of the NATO Treaty. This strategy would help to close the gap between rhetoric and reality. Furthermore, while the NACC's primary responsibility

would be pan-European peacekeeping, it would also be available to respond to requests by the UN Security Council for extra-regional collective security action.

This implies three areas of NATO responsibility: the Atlantic Core, the expanded NACC region, and a third area of potential responsibility beyond the European theater. Ironically, this arrangement has some similarities to George Kennan's 1948 proposal for a "three tiered" NATO membership system (described by Robert Lovett as a system of "resident members, non-resident members and summer privileges").¹⁴ It is instructive that Kennan backed away from this idea because he recognized that NATO had to be primarily a collective defense arrangement which would have a tenuous relationship with the United Nations. He concluded, therefore, that the Alliance stood its best chance of avoiding conflict with the UN if it remained geographically confined.¹⁵

Three tiers of NATO responsibility will be problematic, of course, if it engenders resentment on the part of those Eastern European governments that are members of the NACC but not within the collective defense perimeter of the residual NATO Treaty. The nations of the former Warsaw Pact would nonetheless recognize that this arrangement is a considerable improvement over the current situation of an eviscerated CSCE and no firm commitments from the members of the Atlantic Community.

The most direct way to resolve the problem of voting within the NACC on issues of collective security and pacific settlement is to place such decisions under the authority of the UN Security Council.¹⁶ U.S. policy makers will balk at the prospect of giving up the current situation, in which Washington enjoys the status of *primus inter pares* in NATO decisionmaking, in favor of a UN-dominated system. But as OPERATION DESERT STORM demonstrated, Washington can shape the agenda of the United Nations on major issues of peacekeeping under certain ideal conditions. And absent those conditions, the United States is unlikely to obtain even the support of the current NATO membership for action beyond the currently established treaty area.

Redefining NATO as a more political organization with an expanded membership should help to ease the tension between the Alliance and the EC/WEU. Ideally the EC/WEU group will find it easier to work within this larger NATO forum, as a true European Pillar. A larger and more political NATO will also be easier for France to live with, thereby helping Paris to get rid of some of the old Gaullist baggage which serves neither Atlantic nor French interests. Finally, a pan-European NATO would still be a forum for preserving an American seat at the European table, for adjusting to the reality of German power in Central Europe and for preserving a link between Europe and Turkey.

For its part, Washington should not assume that by adapting NATO to a stronger European Pillar it is setting the stage for American eviction from the Continent. First, as previously mentioned, the EC is not likely to achieve the degree of cooperation in foreign and defense affairs that it has achieved in the economic realm. So there will be ample opportunities for Washington to advance and protect its interests in bilateral and multilateral arrangements within this new NATO forum. Furthermore, I believe that there is more substance than many people realize in the idea of an Atlantic Community. Over the last four decades NATO has evolved into what George Liska has called a "social institution"—a community of democratic values and fundamentally compatible national interests.¹⁷ Washington must be prepared to believe its own rhetoric in this regard, and trust in the ability of that Community to withstand the changes which are taking place.

Finally, with regard to force structure, it would seem that the changes which are currently taking place—downsizing of national contingents and the development of a force which will have both "...immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities..."—seem ideally suited to the demands of a more political and pan-European NATO.¹⁸ The size of the U.S. contribution to this force should be determined by operational requirements rather than by some politically-motivated American formula which equates the number of U.S. troops on the Continent with the level of

U.S. influence over allied policies.¹⁹ This formula was valid during the cold war, but is inappropriate and counterproductive today.

Conclusion.

There are several risks involved in a strategy of positioning NATO between the UN and the EC/WEU as the paramount organization for pan-European political cooperation and peacekeeping. Two deserve special mention. The first risk is that these changes will facilitate the development of a stronger West European defense identity within NATO which will undermine the basic trans-Atlantic bargain. I see this not as a reason to resist organizational change in NATO but rather as an argument in support of structural change as soon as possible. Further progress in the field of West European foreign and defense cooperation seems to be inevitable in any event, even though it is unlikely to lead to the development of an EC army or an EC foreign ministry with real supranational authority. NATO must not be seen as a roadblock to this progress. Otherwise, when a future American President says "love us or tell us to leave," he or she will receive a very different answer than the one that Mr. Bush received in Rome in November 1991. On the other hand, West European governments are likely to welcome, and rely upon, an expanded NATO capable of performing new pan-European political and peacekeeping functions, particularly if the CSCE continues to be perceived as impotent, and they are likely to accord Washington a good deal of status and influence within such an organization.

This may not be enough for the United States. The risk that the United States will lose interest in a Europe that it can no longer control is greater than the risk that Europe will ask Washington to leave. Harking back to the concerns expressed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull during World War II, there is a real danger that Americans will not support U.S. participation in a pan-European institution which is redesigned to facilitate political cooperation and serve the demands of the United Nations on the Continent. It is certainly easier to sell the American people a full blooded collective defense system

against a clear and present danger than it is to sell a system which is committed to such murky premises as collective security and pacific settlement. But NATO already faces this problem as a result of its decision to take on such new missions as "dialogue," "cooperation," and "crisis management and conflict prevention." It will not be long before the neo-isolationists in the United States recognize that NATO is backing into the role of European handmaiden of the United Nations. Redefining NATO now would at least provide a conceptual framework for the changes that are taking place, and perhaps make it easier to rebuff the forces of isolationism.

Reference to the murky premises of collective security and pacific settlement leads me to the second major risk associated with my proposal for redefining NATO. Based on the record of the United Nations and the League of Nations there is little reason to be optimistic about the effectiveness of NATO as a pan-European security organization. Nor is the picture more encouraging if we consider the records of the leading cold war experiments in regional peacekeeping—the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). A redefined NATO will inevitably confront all of the defects that writers such as Inis Claude and Gerhart Niemeyer have associated with international experiments in peacekeeping.²⁰ In particular, a pan-European NATO will confront the conflicting demands of collective security and pacific settlement—what Claude refers to as the tension between "...the use of military might for order-keeping purposes" and the "...soft, anti-military approach to international relations."²¹ This is why NATO must preserve its core identity as a collective defense organization, and preserve the requisite military capability to back up this collective defense commitment, as a form of insurance.

But the cold war era is over, and the politics of collective defense which characterized that era will no longer be sufficient to ensure security or stability on the Continent. And it is neither realistic nor morally justifiable for the nations of the Atlantic Community to seek to isolate themselves from the problems that are already visible beyond the rubble that used to be the Berlin Wall. The alternative is a gamble on a new

system of international peacekeeping. And that gamble is most likely to work if the new system can be built around NATO.

ENDNOTES

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2. Warren Kimball, "Alliances, Coalitions and Ententes," *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, edited by Alexander DeConde, Vol. 1, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978, pp. 1-2.

3. Inis Claude, Jr. *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, fourth edition, New York: Random House, 1971, p. 247.

4. Excerpts are from Kennan's "X" article, as discussed by John Lewis Gaddis, "Mr. 'X' is Consistent and Right," in *Decline of the West?*, edited by George Kennan, *et. al.*, Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1978, pp. 138-139.

5. See Robert C. Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990, p. 25.

6. Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p. 256.

7. All of these schemes are discussed by Douglas Stuart and William Tow, in *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Disputes Since 1949*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, *passim*.

8. Stuart and Tow, *Limits of Alliance*, *passim*. See also, Elizabeth Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990; and Joseph Coffey and Gianni Bonvicini, eds., *The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East*, London: MacMillan, 1989.

9. For analysis and discussion, see Douglas Stuart, "France," in *Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance*, edited by D. Stuart, London: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 46-67.

10. These arguments are developed in more detail by the author in "NATO in the 1980's: Between European Pillar and European House," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1990, pp. 421-436.

11. "The Dream of Europax," *The Economist*, April 7, 1990, p. 14.

12. For an analysis of the Turkish situation, see Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, pp. 34-48.

13. Various authors have looked to the American and Swiss federative experiences for encouragement, but the EC experiment is better understood as *sui generis* because key participants in the EC are major international actors with long historical experience in the exercise, and protection, of sovereignty. For some representative federalist arguments see Clifford Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Community Arrives*, New York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 14-15.

14. "Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security," (July 8, 1948, 10 A.M.), *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1948, Vol. 3, "Western Europe," pp. 165, 168.

15. See D. Stuart and W. Tow, *The Limits of Alliance*, pp. 32-34 and 322.

16. In the future, the composition of the Security Council will have to be changed to reflect new realities. At a minimum, Germany and Japan should be admitted as permanent members of the Security Council and arrangements should be made for increased Third World representation. I nonetheless concur with the finding of the recent report of the Stanley Foundation that while the issue of Security Council composition is an important debate on this question, it "...should not be allowed to detract from current efforts to make the Security Council work as effectively as possible." *Collective Security and the United Nations: An Old Promise in a New Era*, Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. 1991, p. 35.

17. George Liska, *Nations In Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968, p. 61.

18. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* (Agreed Upon by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991), reprinted in *NATO Review*, 6, 39, December 1991, p. 30.

19. For further elaboration, see the article by NATO SACEUR General John Galvin, entitled "From Immediate Defence towards Long-term Stability," in *NATO Review*, 6, 39, December 1991, pp. 14-18. This article discusses in very general terms the military requirements for a new NATO force "capable of several missions, including deterrence and support for crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and, as before, the defence of Alliance territory." (p. 15)

20. See, for example, Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations*, New York: Random House, 1962, Chapters 4 and 5, and Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Balance Sheet of the League Experiment," reprinted in George Lanyi and Wilson McWilliams, eds., *Crisis and Continuity in World Politics*, New York: Random House, 1966, pp. 341-352.

21. Inis Claude, *American Approaches to World Affairs*, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1986, pp. 56-57.

CONCLUSIONS

Gary L. Guertner

The preceding essays have explored the concepts of collective defense and collective security, and assessed the strategic context for their applications in Asia and Europe. Readers should be mindful of three factors that will most affect the value of collective security in the future.

First, in the context of national military strategy, no strategic concept can be evaluated in isolation. The synergistic effects of all strategic concepts applied to achieving military and political objectives must be weighed as part of the strategy formulation process. The potential value of collective security is especially difficult to establish because it requires one nation to link its security to the military capabilities and political will of others. This affects force structure decisions in both the quantitative and qualitative sense, and, in turn, determines capabilities for power projection and crisis response. Its potential must always be balanced against the risks that collective security may require significant limitations on unilateral action.

Second, and intimately related, the American public shows little enthusiasm for an active role as the single, global superpower. Opinion polls reflect an introspective national mood created by domestic problems, especially economic issues, many of which are being attributed to the sacrifices required to win the cold war. During cycles of national introversion, the risks inherent in collective security as an alternative to unilateralism are well worth taking. Greater dependency on allies is politically essential for sharing not only the military burden, but also the increasingly salient political and fiscal responsibilities as well. A new vigor in the United Nations and collective security in general, and a few good victories can be a brake on American tendencies to slide toward isolationism. In Europe, burdensharing in the context of collective security and collective defense is also an essential

deterrent to the nationalization of defense and all of its potentially destabilizing effects.

Third, the architecture and application of collective security and collective defense will be substantially different in Asia than it is in Europe. Cultural and historic links and the "collectiveness of interests" are not the same. As strategy in the New World Order moves from the more concrete structure and substance of collective defense and forward *deployment* to the more trusting and idealist concepts of collective security and forward *presence*, these differences between European and Asian allies may become more apparent, requiring skillful diplomacy as much as military strategy.

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